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This issue brings to a close the first year of publication for the
Montana Business Quarterly. We have been highly pleased
with the response to the new publication. The critical com
ments have been particularly appreciated since we frankly
admit that the publication is in the process of development.
Constructive criticism forces us to reevaluate what we are
doing and why. This urges us to develop processes and for
mats. As a growing and developing publication, we do not want
to become static, but it seems that this is both the time and
the place to indicate what we are trying to do as we now see it
and to explain some of the questions which have been raised
during the course of this first year.
The basic premise behind the publication of the Quarterly
is to make available material concerning the Montana econ
omy and Montana business so that the citizens of the state
may be well informed. A second purpose is to present articles
which we feel would be of interest and value to the business
men of the state. This, of course, gives a scope much more
broad than if we limited it to articles concerned only with busi
ness. It also provides an opportunity for faculty outside the
School of Business Administration to write for the general
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public of the state. This opportunity is lacking in some academic
areas where there is no publication available with general
statewide circulation. However, we always attempt to have at
least one article pertaining to business in each issue.
Having established the basic premise concerning the Quar
terly and its scope, what are the criteria we use in determining
whether or not to publish a specific article? First, the article
must treat the subject matter in a thoughtful and thoughtprovoking manner. Facts and figures used in the article must
be documented as to source so that interested readers may pur
sue them further or make judgments as to the reliability of the
source material. Statements of conclusion must be reasonably
supported by the facts presented or be a logical possible result
of the reasoning presented. The article may not use an emo
tional approach to the problem. In short, the approach, treat
ment, and tone of the article must.be as serious as possible.
Second, the articles must be readable, with a minimum of
technical terms. These articles are written for the general pub
lic rather than an academic audience in the writer’s profes
sional field. Hence, we try to eliminate technical terms and
jargon if they can possibly be avoided. If technical terms must
be used, they should be defined so that a reader will not be
lost in a maze of special language. In these pages the writers
try to communicate as precisely as possible with our readers.
One question is bound to arise when we consider a particular
article. Suppose the author reaches a conclusion which might
not be popular with a segment of our readers — should such
an article be published? By far the easiest decision is to say no.
By rejecting controversial material we can probably avoid
criticism. But that means we must be acquainted with every
conclusion which might prove to be unpopular with any seg
ment of our readers — an obvious impossibility. More impor
tant, it seems to us that we do not fulfill our responsibility to
the citizens of Montana unless we do, in fact, expose them to
differing points of view, provided the article meets the two cri

teria previously explained. In fact, we believe that the great
majority of our readers would like the opportunity to study dif
ferent points of view presented in the most tightly reasoned and
objective manner possible.

FROM THE DIRECTOR’S DESK

U

Over the past year we have provided our readers with arti
cles of varying viewpoint and subject matter; not an easy
task when one considers that articles such as these take from
two to three months of a faculty member’s spare time to write
and polish. (Frequently we have been promised an article only
to find the faculty member concerned has been compelled to lay
the work aside because of a more pressing assignment.) Some
articles are presented to us without much advance notice as to
topic and content. We normally publish them when presented,
achieving balance when we can.
Thus, as a part of a commitment to the presentation of differ
ing points of view, we do our utmost to achieve a balanced pres
entation. However, our readers must have a little patience and
faith as it will take us a little time to make good our commit
ment.
One other pertinent point should be discussed as we assess
the first year of publication. When we laid down basic prem
ises, it was pointed out that we felt obligated to present the
citizens of Montana with the basic facts about the Montana
economy as impartially as we know how. This is the responsi
bility of the Director and from time to time he is aided, at his
request, by the Assistant Director. Since both of us are deeply
concerned with Montana’s future we are naturally discouraged
when the picture is not as glowing as we would like. However,
we believe that satisfactory growth cannot be achieved until
Montana squarely faces the economic facts of life and begins
to progress from there.
In connection with this aspect of the Quarterly, we’ve been
asked why we continually use figures covering a ten or twelve
year span, instead of working just from year to year. Agricul
ture, mining, lumbering, and construction have been extremely
important factors to the economy of Montana. By their very
nature these segments of the economy can fluctuate widely
from year to year. For example, a severe drought can cause a
wide fluctuation in agricultural income, as can a good year
accompanied by a sharp price increase. As a result, the year
to year agricultural figures tend to present a distorted picture.
The use of a ten or twelve year period, using all of the years
in the period instead of selected years, makes it possible to
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observe trends. This is the material we feel most obligated to
present, because it is not usually available elsewhere.
We are also frequently asked why, when we cite figures on
Montana economy, we usually avoid many statistics about the
current year, particularly those available from some popular
sources. The primary reason for avoiding them is that they are
very likely to be revised several times before the final figures
are published. Some of these estimates may deviate consider
ably from the final figure — a fact which makes their use con
fusing. For example, one source estimates personal income by
months; in 1961 there was an original estimate plus a first and
second revision for each month as well as for the year. The
difference in the original estimate from the second revision
ranged from 5.0 percent in the August figure to 9.4 percent in
the November figure. In each case the original estimate was
higher than the final figure. The original estimate for the year
was 7.8 percent higher than the final figure. This same publica
tion has an excellent record for accuracy in most other states.
However, in a state with a relatively sparse population and a
primarily raw material economy such as Montana, the diffi
culties of making an accurate monthly estimate are stagger
ing. Instead of leaving these few states out, the publication
feels it is necessary to make the estimates in the best possible
manner under the circumstances. Montana Business Quarterly
does not make such an attempt because we feel that possible
inaccuracies are more misleading than using a number of statis
tics covering the current year which would have to be revised
later.
The way in which we present the picture of the economy has
caused some of our readers to believe that we have no faith
in the Montana economy or in the long run prospects for the
state. This is an incorrect conclusion, though admittedly it
could be drawn by those who do not grasp our long range
intentions. We believe that Montana has good prospects — pros
pects which can best be developed when they are based upon
a thorough and honest appraisal of our problems and needs.
Thus, as we assess the first year of publication of the Mon
tana Business Quarterly, we are pleased, but far from satis
fied. We are pleased because of the highly favorable response
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received not only within Montana, but from various parts of
the country. We believe the Quarterly is better than its prede
cessor, the Montana Business Review. We are dissatisfied be
cause we see a great deal of room for improvement. With the
help of “constructive criticism” from our readers and constant
reevaluation by our staff, we are firmly resolved to make Mon
tana Business Quarterly a growing and improving publication,
written especially for a Montana with good prospects in view.

Dean and Director

Educational Opportunities
In the Forty-First State
FRANK C. ABBOTT
Acting President
Montana State University
Missoula, Montana

It is a peculiar fact that while Americans in 1963 are prob
ably shaped more significantly by education than by any other
social force, we take for granted the virtues of our educational
system and too often fail to probe deeply for understanding of
its problems and limitations.
One could present all kinds of evidence concerning the im
portance of education in the contemporary world. As a dean
I have been impressed by the faith that young people and par
ents, too, place in a college degree. Of course, this faith is
supported by cold facts. At the turn of the present century
only 18 percent of the labor force wore white collars in profes
sional, managerial, clerical, sales and other comparable endeav
ors; by 1960 the figure was 42 percent, an astounding change
in the basic composition of the labor force in a little over half
a century. Moreover, from 1947 to 1962, while the total labor
force grew by some 10 million workers, the number of white
collar workers grew by 9.7 million — 97 percent of the total.
The increase in professional and technical workers has been
the largest in any employment category; and in the decade
ahead it is expected that this group will increase more than
twice as fast as the average increase for all fields of work.
Since 1900, the proportion of farm workers has declined dra
matically, and “blue collar” workers have remained a relatively
stable proportion of the labor force.1 The striking thing is the
’Superintendent of Documents, U.S.G.P.O., Manpower Report of the
President . . . Transmitted to the Congress March 1963, pp. 26, 100, and
Table G-5 (p. 201).
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growth in the proportion of white collar workers, persons hold
ing positions which typically require more than an average
education and in a great many cases, advanced education of a
high order.
Another measure of the importance that we place on educa
tion is the fact that more public funds are spent on education in
this country than for any other public purpose except national
defense. So far as state and local governmental activity is con
cerned, in 1961 education represented 37 percent of all state
and local expenditures.2 Nationally, expenditures for public
and private education in 1960 amounted to more than $25 billion
or 5.0 percent of gross national product — more than one third
more than the share of the gross national product which went
to education in 1950.3 In terms of dollars, this indicates a very
substantial commitment to education.
One could cite other indications of the importance of educcation today — the impressive march of science into all areas
of human experience; the advance of automation and its impli
cations for education; the growing complexity of international
and interpersonal relationships and the ominous difficulty of
finding ways to live together in peace. However, there is broad
agreement on the importance of education, so with this brief
backdrop as to the role of education in our society, let us con
sider more specifically the status of educational opportunity in
the forty-first state — the state of Montana, forty-first to enter
the Union and thus a relatively young state, and a vigorous one.
First of all, how are we doing with regard to education in
relation to our sister states, older or younger? It seems we
are doing reasonably well; indeed very well in some respects.
Nearly half of all Montana residents (47.8 percent) have four
or more years of high school education, versus a national aver
age of 41.1 percent; and in this respect Montana leads such
states as Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and many
others.4 Seven and five-tenths percent of our people have four
“National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1963, (Wash
ington, D.C., 1963), Table 78.
“American Council on Education, Office of Statistical Information and
Research, A Fact Book on Higher Education, Tables 137, 232.
^National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1963, Table 45.
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years of college against a national average of 7.7 percent, so
we are slightly under the average in this regard just as we are
considerably above it with respect to high school.5 Another
indication that we are doing well is that Montana consistently
stands near the top among the states in the percent of Selective
Service registrants who pass the Selective Service mental test.
In 1961, for example, the most recent year reported, our record
was narrowly beaten by only three states — Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming.6
In terms of effort in behalf of education as measured by
tax collections, tax dollars spent for education, average support
per pupil, and like indicators, Montana has reason for pride.
Though in personal income in 1961 we stood 32nd (more than
10 percent below the U.S. average), in per capita state and local
expenditures for all public education we were 12th among the
50 states, well above the national average; and in total state
and local tax collections as a percentage of personal income
that same year we stood second in the nation.7 In short, though
our tax resources are below average, our state and local effort
in behalf of public education is decidedly above average. The
Montana fiscal commitment to education is impressive.
On more strictly academic measures, elementary and secon
dary education in the forty-first state stand up very well in
some respects. Montana was fifth in the nation in 1961 in what
we call the pupil-teacher ratio — the number of pupils for
each teacher. Against a U.S. ratio of 25.6 pupils per teacher, in
Montana we had one teacher for each 21.5 pupils. Montana also
ranks well in attendance ratios; in 1960-61, we led all the states
with an average of 96.5 percent of our youngsters in school
daily.8 This top-level performance was an extremely fine show
ing, especially considering the distances some of our children
have to go to school and the nature of our winters.
Realism compels us to recognize that our favorable standing
in the pupil-teacher ratio, and perhaps our strong attendance
record are partly a result of having schools, often small schools,
6Ibid.,
"Ibid.,
'Ibid.,
"Ibid.,

Table 46.
Table 48.
Tables 49, 77, 63.
Table 38; Rankings of the States, 1961, Table 17.
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relatively near our communities, in some cases at the cost of
operating a more efficient-sized school that would have to be
somewhat farther away. The fact that we have many small
schools is not in itself necessarily a sign of either weakness or
strength. However, we do have an extraordinary number of
small schools in Montana.
During this past school year, roughly 675 of our 782 elemen
tary school districts (86 percent) employed four or fewer teach
ers. Ninety-four of our 169 high schools (56 percent) enrolled
fewer than 125 pupils (in grades 9-12) and only forty of our
high schools had more than 200 students.9 We may contrast
this fact with the considered view of Dr. J. B. Conant, who
urges that a school with one hundred students in the graduat
ing class represents the smallest size economically practicable
for a diverse program to meet the interests and capabilities
of diverse students.10
The small school, perhaps especially the small high school,
does pose some hard problems for Montana. The demands that
our times place upon our entire educational system have borne
down with special force upon the high schools; demands for
mathematics, science, foreign languages, English composition
and literature and other “college-preparatory” subjects are
greater than they were only a few years ago. Part of this results
from the pressures on the colleges to step up their own require
ments and attainments. Partly, though, it results from the fact
that a much higher proportion of high school students today are
college-bound than was the case only a decade or two ago.
When only one in ten or even one in five high school students
went to college, the high school naturally had a major concern
with the 9 in 10, or 4 in 5, who did not. Today in the nation and
in Montana, roughly 4 out of each 10 high school-age young
sters go on to college, and substantially more than that intend
to do so and therefore seek to prepare themselves for it. Be
cause well-qualified teachers of mathematics and science and
languages and indeed, of any subject, are hard to come by and
"Data supplied by Bureau of Educational Research, Montana State
University.
'“James B. Conant, The American High School Today (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), pp. 14, 37-38, 77-80.
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command relatively high salaries, our high schools, and espe
cially our small high schools, face increasingly acute problems.
Acknowledging both achievements and problems of our ele
mentary and secondary schools and the certainty that careful
planning will be needed to retain the strengths and overcome
the limitations, how about Montana colleges? Here too, as with
regard to public education generally, the forty-first state has
done extremely well in some important respects.
First of all, higher educational opportunity in Montana is
remarkably open and available to all. This is true in part be
cause of the wise policy of giving any Montana high school
graduate an opportunity to discover, and to demonstrate to
others, whether he or she has what it takes to succeed in col
lege. Under the impact of rising enrollments a number of states
that formerly admitted any high school graduate to the state
colleges have set entrance requirements of one kind or another,
including mental tests which are supposed to decide between
those who are qualified and those who are not. While I am not
an expert on testing, I am familiar enough with the considered
judgments of test experts to know that no test has been or can
be ever devised which will tell us whether a youngster has
what it takes to succeed in college as accurately as an oppor
tunity for that youngster to demonstrate this in action.
In addition, state support in Montana has been provided in
an amount intended to keep student fees and other costs at a
relatively modest level. Our fees and board and room costs
are not low compared to other state universities, but neither
are they excessively high.11 Taken together with our “open
door” policy on admissions, the cost structure helps give Mon
tana youth an opportunity for higher education that probably
is unsurpassed in this country.
Furthermore, Montana has provided a good spread of edu
cational opportunity, both geographically and by type of edu
cational program. Six units in this large state are spread from
Billings to Havre to Missoula and Dillon where everything
may be learned from A to Z — from Agriculture to Zoology —
well, not quite everything, but a very great deal!
"American Council on Education, Office of Statistical Information and
Research, op. cit., Table 220.
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And to offer opportunity both to young people, and to the
Montana public which depends upon the services of highly
trained professional people, there is an interstate program in
which Montana participates — WICHE, the Western Interstate
Commission on Higher Education — through which a number
of Montana youth are aided in the study of medicine and den
tistry and veterinary medicine at universities in other states.
These are schools that are extremely costly to build and to
operate; schools which Montana need not finance at this time,
thanks to the opportunity it buys through WICHE.
It should be emphasized that Montana has built educational
programs selectively in the six units of the University. As
recently as October 1962, in the Master Plan the State Board
of Regents reaffirmed the historic policy of the Legislature
and the Board that there shall be differentiation of function
among the several units. This policy means that, for example,
agriculture and electrical or civil engineering will be offered
at Bozeman and not, in the present decade at least, in Missoula
or elsewhere; and that law and pharmacy, as examples, will
be at Missoula and not at Bozeman. Of course there are numer
ous fundamental disciplines and even professional programs
(like education) in which some degree of duplication is neces
sary, either because of the importance of the field in a college
education or because of the extent of needs of the state.
It is obvious that it costs more to offer the same programs in
several institutions than to assign programs to the several units
selectively, in accordance with their central objectives. Some
duplication among units is inevitable. The aim has been to
keep it to a desirable minimum. With Montana’s limited base
of population and fiscal capacity it seems evident that this
historic policy of differentiation has had a great deal to do
with the fact that the state has built a university system of
which we can be proud, not only because of the factors already
cited but because this system is doing a high-quality job.
Let me support this assertion of quality with two quick but
telling sets of facts relevant to MSU. The most recent figures
available indicate that in all state universities in the country,
47.6 percent of the faculty hold the doctor’s degree; whereas
at MSU, 55.3 percent hold this degree, an extremely signifi-
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cant fact.12 Second, the library collection at MSU is an out
standing one. Data from the Executive Secretary of the Uni
versity of Montana indicate that the 265,000 volumes at MSU
(excluding U.S. government documents) represent a better per
student book collection than at any state university in Colo
rado, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, or Wyo
ming.13 These evidences of quality reflect effort and achieve
ment over a period of years. Such attainments are not provided
for overnight.
From the picture thus far sketched it seems evident that
Montanans have reason both for pride in their educational sys
tem and for a degree of optimism. All things considered, edu
cational opportunity is in good shape in the forty-first state.
This state of affairs has been bought at considerable cost; evi
dently Montana residents and taxpayers have long thought
their investment in education to be wise. But how about the
future? Larger numbers of children born since the war are
now in the high schools and approaching the university, and
with all the pressures upon our educational system from out
side the state, can Montana maintain its strong position of
educational quality in the years ahead?
Doubtless it can, but there are numerous pitfalls in the way.
I have already referred to the pressures for upgrading teaching
in all areas of elementary and secondary education, and to
some of the costs we must be prepared to contend with in return
for the privilege of maintaining small schools, close to our com
munities.
The first point I would make with respect to higher educa
tion is that quality is defined and determined not only by what
we in Montana do, but by persons, groups, and developments
throughout this country and the world.
Factors outside the forty-first state affect the quality of the
students we have. Many of Montana’s most promising young
people are bid away from us with scholarships offered by fine
institutions as far away as Boston, Philadelphia, and Los AniaUniversity of Montana System of Higher Education, Master Plan Study,
Status Report, February 1, 1963, p. 20.
"Memorandum to Unit Presidents and Institutional Studies Officers,
January 7, 1963.
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geles. For example, one public university in an agricultural
state in the Midwest last year offered 1,175 opportunities for
graduate studies with stipends ranging from $300 to $2,500, plus
exemption from the non-resident fee. We all know students
from our high schools who have gone to colleges outside the
state on undergraduate scholarships. We can keep some of these
able young people only by providing quality education in our
own state.
Factors outside Montana affect the quality and the cost of
our faculty, too. We seek the well-qualified person who is inter
ested in us at the price -we can afford to pay, wherever he may
be. And so do colleges and universities throughout the nation.
In consequence, the marketplace for faculty members is na
tional and even international in scope. At MSU we have re
cently employed men from as far as the University of Toronto
and the University of Vienna. Last year the approximately
three dozen persons who were employed at MSU as replace
ments or as additions to meet increased enrollments came from
16 states, the District of Columbia, and four foreign countries.
The salaries we pay are necessarily determined by the com
petition we must meet outside this state. The people who left
us last year to take positions in other institutions have earned
on the average 34 percent more than they would have received
at MSU. Pressure mounts under competition from outside.
Our marvelous countryside does have some holding power,
but we cannot fall behind our competition in salary levels with
out losing the very teachers who lend distinction and quality
to our institutions.
Finally, we must recognize that standards for what is excel
lent in higher education are determined by forces outside this
state. Most people know of the “accrediting associations” and
their standards. However, these regional and national associa
tions exert less potent influences than the accomplishments
of scholars and scientists throughout the country and through
out the world with whom our scholars and scientists must
keep up, and to whose scholarship our people must contribute,
if we are to be in the same league. The quality of our educa
tional achievements will be measured in terms of science and
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scholarship which knows no boundaries either state or na
tional.
In the face of the fact that the quality of our Montana system
will in essence be determined by forces and standards established outside the state, we should take sober notice of needs
and developments in Montana, especially in two interrelated
areas.
One of these is the certain need for the further development
of graduate work in the two multipurpose units, MSU and
MSC. Student demand for graduate study is increasing very
rapidly in virtually all fields. Though we have heard more
about the “tidal wave” of undergraduates, since World War II
graduate enrollments in the U.S. have been rising much more
rapidly than undergraduate enrollments.1-1In many fields today
one cannot obtain responsible employment, one cannot per
form a professional role, without one or more years of graduate
or advanced professional study. Further, in more and more
fields graduate students are an important factor in faculty
research and scholarship, which in turn are critical factors in
attracting and retaining the kind of superior faculty we must
have. The necessary growth of graduate study would not be
so sobering a prospect if it were not a fact that it is several
times as costly as most undergraduate instruction.
The second need, related to the first, is the natural urge for
every unit in the Montana University System to aspire to
become a full-fledged university. We readily acknowledge this
aspiration in Missoula; we think the people of Montana have
expected us to have that aspiration, and grasp the importance
of a quickened sense of it, now. We should expect our colleagues
in Bozeman to acknowledge this aspiration too, and for the
same reason. Elsewhere in the state — at Billings, Butte, Dillon
and Havre — there is no expectation of becoming another
“Berkeley” immediately. However, the urge to grow is there
because growth appears as an avenue to broader and deeper,
and therefore better, educational programs. Eastern Montana
College of Education has proposed that it be authorized to
"Bernard Berelson, Graduate Education in the United States (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 32, 101.
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offer liberal arts degrees. MSC has been proposing for several
years that it be authorized to offer the B.A. degree in English,
history and economics.15 Name-change proposals for five of the
six University units were aired in the last Legislature, reflect
ing actual or proposed developments in educational program.
Our aspiration-level in Montana is high.
If we are to avoid building on quick-sand in response to
these aspirations, we had better give careful attention to some
hard facts. Our level of personal income per capita falls below
the national average. Furthermore, in the last decade the in
crease in per capita personal income in Montana was less than
in any of the United States with a single exception, and our
expenditures per pupil in average daily attendance increased
less than in 46 of the other states. While our increase in that
decade was 46.1 percent, 46 states increased their per pupil
expenditures more than we did.16
We need to be aware of the very real practical limitations
within which we work. There are as many square miles in
Montana as in the six New England states plus New York
and most of Pennsylvania — and two percent as many people.
Our population in all of Montana barely rivals that of down
town Pittsburgh, a city which does not support even one public
college or university.
Montana is a wonderful place to live, to raise a family, to
educate the children. Montanans feel deeply about opportunity
for education at all levels — elementary, secondary, and higher.
Against somewhat limited economic resources, Montana citi
zens are already taxing themselves relatively more heavily
than most U.S. citizens to provide good schools and colleges.
We have been able to achieve a high level of quality in our
college and university programs because we have assigned
distinctive functions to the several units, have minimized
duplication of offerings and have concentrated graduate work
at MSU and MSC. In the years ahead there will be, as there
have been in the past, severe pressures to expand rapidly in
’“See Montana State College, Master Plan Report, December 1961, p. 40.
'"National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1963, Tables 50,
83.
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some University of Montana units into areas already available
in others. These pressures will come in the name of extending
“educational opportunity” for the young people of the locality
concerned and of the state.
But “educational opportunity” is made up both of access to
a school and of quality of the offering. The one without the
other is of no value. The quality we are able to achieve will be
determined by our response to factors that are national and
international in scope, factors over which Montanans have
relatively little control.
In Montana in the past we have had a large measure of both
access and quality, by virtue of some hard choices and rigor
ous limitation of programs. In Montana in the future we can
retain both access and quality by the same kind of informed
and intelligent choices. In the light of sober economic facts,
we can retain both access and quality only through such
choices.

PART I

Bankruptcy Causes and Remedies
NORMAN E. TAYLOR
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Montana State University, Missoula

Let9s Go B ankrupt!.
The jocular title above seems to be the rallying cry for more
and more Americans. What used to be a grave family tragedy
now appears to be regarded as a routine, pragmatic financial
adjustment. Apparently there is no longer any social or eco
nomic stigma connected with the public confession that a per
son cannot (or will not) pay his bills.
The idea of bankruptcy goes far back into history. It has
taken such forms as “imprisoning the debtor’s person in
chains, subjecting him to stripes and hard labor, at the mercy
of his rigid creditors, and sometimes selling him, with his wife
and children, into perpetual foreign slavery, ” or the form
whereby the creditors might cut the debtor’s body into pieces,
and each take his proportionate share.”1 It was the Christian
emperors of Rome who first denied a “Shylock” his pound of
flesh and permitted a debtor to turn over his assets to his
creditors in lieu of his person.
The first English Bankruptcy Act in 1542, and the first
American Bankruptcy Act of 1800, applied only to traders. As
Blackstone stated, “that class of men are, generally speaking,
the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability
to pay their debts, without any fault of their own;” whereas,
if persons in other situations of life run into debt, they must
take the consequences of their own indiscretion.”2 But Blackstone s argument did not prevail and non-traders were included
L. Y. Smith and G. G. Roberson, Business Law: Uniform Commercial
Code Edition, (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1962), p. 1155.
2I b i d p. 1155.
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within the scope of the second Bankruptcy Act passed by Con
gress in 1841. Under the authority specifically granted in the
Constitution,3 Congress has passed a total of four bankruptcy
acts. The last of these acts, passed on July 1, 1898, was over
hauled by Congress in 1938. The revision is known as the
Chandler Act and remains, for the most part, the law today.
Recent articles in national, state, and local news media indi
cate that many people are concerned with the growing prob
lem of bankruptcy. It seems also to be true that, like the
weather, everyone is talking about bankruptcy but no one is
doing anything about it.4 One reason is that there is little
agreement as to the cause (s) of bankruptcy among attorneys,
businessmen, lenders, and consumer-creditors.
It is doubtful that very many bankruptcy petitioners proceed
because the exemptions are attractive, although substantial
assets are exempted for some types of applicants. Montana
law provides for each bankrupt the exemption of such valued
necessities as wearing apparel, books (to $200), household fur
niture, one sewing machine, stove and stove-pipes, bedsteads,
three months’ fuel and food, one horse, saddle and bridle, two
cows and their calves, four hogs and 50 domestic fowls, feed
for animals for three months, one clock, and all family pictures
(among numerous other miscellaneous items).8
Specific exemptions are given for individuals in selected
occupations. For example, the farmer can keep, among other
things, the farming utensils or implements of husbandry, not
exceeding in value six hundred dollars;0 doctors can keep one
vehicle and harness or other equipment used in making profes
sional visits, with food for such horse, mule, or oxen for three
months;7 debtors who are heads of families, or are 60 years of
age, can keep “one truck or automobile of the value of not more
than three hundred dollars.”8 Montana law capriciously places*
*The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Sec. 8.
‘There are a few exceptions: see The Great Falls Tribune, January 31,
1963, page 17, which describes a cooperative debt counseling program.
“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Sec. 93-5813, p. 441.
’Ibid., Sec. 93-5814, p. 442.
Tbid., Sec. 93- 5814, p. 443.
"Ibid., Sec. 93-5820, p. 447.
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rigid dollar limits on exemptions in some categories and none
at all in others.
There is no way to measure the grief, embarrassment, or
guilt of those taking the bankruptcy course. Those who are the
innocent victims of accidents or ill health deserve the chance
to start again, but many who undertake bankruptcy do so
reluctantly, feeling that the action is unavoidable yet immoral.
Others choose bankruptcy to avoid garnishment because, since
garnishment may involve loss of one’s job, it is even more to
be avoided.
Certainly creditors are not enthusiastic when their custom
ers wipe the slate clean and leave them to pick up the tab. In
1962, in Montana, creditors in bankruptcy actions were owed
$2,893,653, but the shown assets of debtors were only $804,995.°
Also in that year, unsecured creditors received only 4.5 percent
of the sums due them.10
What is the evidence that bankruptcies are increasing? Refer
ring to Table 1, we can observe that, for the United States,
total bankruptcies increased from 10,195 in 1946, to 147,780 in
1962. In Montana, over the same years, the increase was from
20 to 559. For fiscal year 1963 it is possible that:
. . . during this year 170,000 bankruptcy cases will be listed in
the 90 district courts of the United States and of these cases,
probably 100,000 will be no-asset cases with scheduled liabilities
approximating $500 million. The bulk of this half-billion dollar
loss will be in cases known as consumer bankruptcies.”

What factors may account for the large number of bankrupt
cies in recent years? One might expect the growth of bank
ruptcies roughly to parallel the gains in number of residents
for the country. Such is not the case, however. The percentage
increase in total bankruptcies after accounting for population
change show that total U. S. bankruptcies increased 1,003 per
cent (1946-1962) while Montana shows a 1,920 percent increase
(see Table 1). The percentage of increase comparison is mis*The Daily Missoulian, Missoula, Montana, February 4, 1963, p. 2.
’“Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statis
tics, June 30, 1962, Washington, D.C., Table F. 6.
’’Reginald W. McDuffee, “Wage Earner (Chapter XIII) Proceedings in
the Bankruptcy Court,” The Business Lawyer, April, 1962, Vol. XVII,
No. 3, p. 678.

28

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

BANKRUPTCY CAUSES AND REMEDIES

29

30

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

leading, however; comparing the number of bankruptcies per
100,000 people we find that in the last six years the Montana
rate has merely caught up with the national rate after being
roughly one-half as great for eleven prior years.
If we subtract the business bankruptcies from these figures,
we see that the absolute change of nonbusiness bankruptcies,
1946 to 1962, was from 8,566 to 132,118 (see Table 2). After
adjusting for population growth, the nation still showed an
increase of 1,064 percent; Montana’s increase of nonbusiness
bankruptcies was more than double this figure. As was noted
above, the Montana rate in absolute numbers simply caught
up with the national rate. The rising incidence of bankruptcy
obviously is not accounted for by population changes, then.
Next, one might try to relate financial failure to income and
one’s ability to pay. In theory at least, with substantial in
creases in personal incomes, one might reasonably expect a
decline in the number of people initiating bankruptcy. Again
we are disappointed. For the United States the increase in non
business bankruptcies was from 49 per billion dollars of per
sonal income in 1946, to 302 in 1962, an increase of 519 percent.
(Table 3). We know that inflation cannot account for the
change since prices have not risen by anything approaching
500 percent.12 Real incomes were rising, not falling. In Montana,
the nonbusiness bankruptcy rate per billion dollars of per
sonal income was 24 in 1946, and 321 in 1962, a 1,214 percent
increase. In real terms, the non-business bankruptcy rate per
billion dollars of personal income for Montana has doubled in
the two-year interval 1960-1962; it is actually ahead of the
United States ratio! The rise in the number of bankruptcies
occurred despite substantial personal income increases.
It was argued by some with whom we talked that the rising
bankruptcy rate could be attributed to the growing number
of attorneys. The hypothesis was that a greater supply of attor
neys, unable to create or initiate legal controversy and lucra
tive fees, would naturally give increasing attention to bank
ruptcy and similar marginal legal tasks in order to produce
’“Wholesale prices for March, 1963, were only 16.4 percent above the
1949 index; consumer prices for February, 1963, were 23.1 percent
above the index for 1949. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1963, p. 532.)
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revenues. While our investigation of this point was cursory,
the evidence obtained did not support the argument. In the
first place, a quick glance at the Minimum Fee Schedule of the
Western Montana Bar Association is persuasive evidence that
bankruptcy action fees are not attractive to lawyers. In the
second place, for the state of Montana, during the twelve years
1950-1961 the number of practicing attorneys increased less
than 45 percent, while the number of bankruptcies increased
27 times during the same period. Indeed, two counties (Mis
soula and Silver Bow) which had substantial increases in bank
ruptcies for 1957-1961, during the same interval had a decrease
in the number of attorneys.13
The increase in the number of U.S. retail establishments
TABLE 4
AVERAGE RETAIL SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT,
UNITED STATES, 1946-1962
Number
Average Sales
of
Index
Sales
Outlets Per Establishment
(1946=100)
Year
($
Thousands)
($ Billions)
(000)
100.0
1946 ..............
72
1,458
104.8
1947 ___
104.2
75
122.4
1,627
106.9
1948
77
133.7
1,730
104.2
1949
75
133.8
1,783
113.9
1950 ___
82
147.2
1,802
119.4
1951
86
156.6
1,821
1952 ....
123.6
89
162.4
1,831
127.8
1953 .....
92
169.1
1,846
126.4
1954 ....
91
169.2
1,861
136.1
1955
1,874
98
183.8
138.9
1956
100
189.7
1,903
144.4
1957
104
200.0
1,926
141.7
1958
102
200.4
1,955
151.4
1959 ....
109
215.4
1,977
152.8
I960
110
219.5
1,997
151.4
1961
109
218.8
2,011
161.1
19621 .
116
235.3
2,022
'Preliminary.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics,
Business Statistics, 1961 Edition, and Survey of Current Business.
'“Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, (Summit, New Jersey: MartindaleHubbell, Inc.), Volumes 82-93 (1950-1961).
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competing for consumers’ dollars was only 39 percent from
1946 to 1962; moreover, there was an increase in the average •
sales per establishment of 61 percent (Table 4). This element •
seems to be minor in explaining the increase of bankruptcies.
It is obvious that changes in population, in income, in the
numbers of firms and attorneys, and other lesser factors do
help to establish the frequency of both types of bankruptcies.
It is even possible that non-business bankruptcies can be re
lated to the growing number of consumer finance companies,
or to the increasing proportion of debt consolidation loans
(whereby the lender becomes a primary creditor); however,
time did not permit the exploration of all possibilities. Tech
nology, industry structural changes, and migration of markets
TABLE 5
TOTAL BANKRUPTCIES AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES
PER BILLION DOLLARS OF CONSUMER CREDIT,
UNITED STATES, 1946-1962
Bankruptcies
per Billion Dollars of Consumer Credit1
Total
Non-Business
Bankruptcies
Bankruptcies
Consumer
Credit
Index
Index
Year
($ Billions) Number (1946 = 100) Number (1946=100)
1946 -------8.4
1,214
100.0
1,020
100.0
1947
11.6
1,135
93.5
882
86.5
1948 -------14.4
1,285
92.2
940
105.8
1949
17.3
1,504
108.4
123.9
1,106
1950
21.4
1,560
128.5
1,170
114.7
1951 -------22.6
1,557
128.2
120.6
1,230
1952
27.5
1,268
101.0
104.4
1,030
1953
31.4
1,277
105.2
104.0
1,061
1954
32.5
133.4
1,635
134.7
1,361
1955
38.8
1,531
1,294
126.9
126.1
1956
42.3
1,468
122.0
1,244
120.9
1957
45.0
1,639
138.6
135.0
1,414
1958
45.1
2,032
167.4
174.5
1,780
1959 --------51.5
1,955
169.3
161.0
1,727
1960
56.0
171.2
1,965
161.9
1,746
1961 -------57.7
2,541
223.2
2,277
209.3
1962
63.4
2,331
204.3
192.0
2,084
bankruptcies on fiscal year basis.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and Board of Gov
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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may also account for numerous business failures. Nevertheless,
for the “non-business bankrupt,” the major cause appears to be
easy credit, and it may well be a principal factor in business
mortality, too. Of much greater importance than the number
of competing firms is the degree of competition between them;
an increasingly common merchandising technique is credit sell
ing which can be a very aggressive competitive element.
When we refer to Table 5, it is quickly apparent that the rate
of increase in the volume of consumer credit more closely
approximates the rate of increase of bankruptcies than does
any other index examined so far. It seems to be a standard
practice for retailers of all kinds of merchandise to offer
credit. Credit availability is a major patronage motive. Ex
tended terms are often characterized as “hidden price cuts.”
Even the largest traditional cash and carry merchants have
adopted credit plans in recent years (Sears, Wards, and Penneys, for example).
During the first seventeen post World War II years the level
of consumer credit grew each year; it was 655 percent greater
in 1962 than in 1946. It is granted that American consumers
had great liquidity and considerable assets in 1946, so that one
might properly question the validity of this year as a base.
However, Table 6 (Column 6) shows that this splurge had
run its course by 1951, yet in both absolute and real terms
the volume of credit continued to grow rapidly. It must be
noted that consumers’ net worth also increased greatly during
this period. From 1952 to 1962 the increase was from $849.4 bil
lion to $1,525.6 billion.14
Column 3 of the same table shows the ratio of consumer
credit to total retail sales. The role of credit is dramatically
apparent. In every year since 1946, the ratio of consumer credit
outstanding to total retail sales has increased. From 8.0 percent
in 1946 it rose to 26.9 percent in 1962. The willingness to borrow
is evident, but so is the willingness to lend.
Equally interesting is the relationship of consumer credit
to personal income for this period of time. In every year but
“National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Facts Yearbook,
Washington, D.C., p. 30,
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three, the credit figure as a percentage of aggregate personal
income has grown larger. The years of exception (1951, 1958,
and 1961) were all years of recession or readjustment. In 1962,
the peak figure of 14.5 percent was achieved. With another
seven million unit automobile year in the making, this figure
may well exceed 15 percent for 1963.15
In Chart I the downturns of 1957-58 and 1960-61 (see below)
CHART I
CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT AS A PERCENT OF
DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME, 1956-1962

(quarterly totals seasonally adjusted at annual rates)

Ptf Ctnt

Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact
Yearbook. (Federal Reserve Board and Department of Commerce),
Chart 22, p. 36.

are also mirrored in the higher “repayment to borrowed” ratio.
It is interesting to note the reaction of different business media
pundits to this behavior. A bank newsletter comments:
This ratio of instalment repayments to disposable personal in
come rose for a decade after World War II as people were
equipping themselves with new cars and appliances . .. There is
certainly no fixed limit on the amount of instalment credit
which consumers may commit themselves to repaying. There is
a long-term trend toward financing an increasing share of pur“Table 9 shows that, for 1962, of the total instalment credit of $48.2
billion, $19.4 billion was in automobile paper.
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chases on credit, and the fact that individuals are willing to
enlarge their forward commitments is evidence of optimism
over the outlook and their ability to meet future payments. The
current period of business expansion can be prolonged if people
do not go overboard borrowing to spend and if instalment lend
ers avoid unsound extension of credit terms.18

Despite the evidence cited that credit has been a major ele
ment in the tremendous post-war boom and sustained economic
growth, these bankers contradict their own data by concluding
that the current expansion can be extended if people buy less
(by borrowing less).
Forbes magazine took a different point of view:
The old American virtue of thrift may, as many sociologists
insist, have fallen victim to the blandishments of instalmentplan buying. Be that as it may, the U.S. consumer has not gone
hog-wild: the average family has displayed a stubbornly sen
sible refusal to allow its instalment obligations to get above
13 percent of disposable income. Through mid-year, in fact,
consumers repaid their debts faster than they were incurring
new ones . . . All of which may have been reassuring in a moral
sense, but it tended to hold back the boom many economists
thought the U.S. would be having by now.17

This respected journal is probably more representative of
over-all business sentiment (judging from the willingness of
merchants to extend credit.) Obviously, borrowing by business
firms to finance plant expansion or equipment purchases is
part of essential planning for orderly firm growth; this sort of
debt has increased enormously. Denying consumers the same
rationale is at least confusing, if not unfair.
Easy credit can, and does, stimulate buying, production,
employment, and profits. However, it may and does contribute
to bankruptcy, bad debt losses, social frustration, higher oper
ating costs for creditors, and higher prices for the consumers
who do pay their bills on time (or in cash).
Retailers seem to be taking a curious moral position when
they advise that customers should not over-extend themselves.
In effect they are telling money-short customers to ignore
sellers’ (and/or lenders’) blandishments in flashing neon or*14
First National City Bank of New York, Monthly Economic Letter,
June, 1963, p. 63.
14“Too Much Thrift/’ Forbes, November 15, 1961, p. 38.
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blatant headlines . . . Easy Credit . . . No Money Down . . .
36 Months to Pay . . . Lay Away Your Christmas Gifts Now,
First Payment in February . . . No Co-Signers . . . Up to $500
on Your Signature . . . Choose from Three Convenient Credit
Plans, and so on. The ultimate in such exhortations was prob
ably reached in Chicago used-car advertising as noted in Time
magazine:
(a) STOP!! If you have just turned 21— been repossessed —
bad credit problems — been turned down — then now is the
time to see us. Bankrupt?? WE FINANCE ANYONE! Try
our easy credit “OK.”
(b) BANKRUPT? Short on cash — been turned down — Just
turned 21? No red tape. See M r._____ WORKINGMAN’S
FRIEND. Free, easy credit “OK.”
(c) WALK IN. DRIVE OUT. Bankrupt? Short on cash? Bad
credit? Just turned 21? Been turned down? WE FINANCE
ANYONE! Free tank of gas. Free license plates.1*

The above copy appeared in three adjoining column ads
in a recent issue of the Chicago Sun Times. Retailers catering
to bankrupt or other habitual bad-debtors seem to be carrying
specialization too far. The paradoxical appeal to bankrupts as
clientele is understandable only when it is noted that such
individuals cannot petition again for bankruptcy for six years.
Thus, garnishment cannot be aborted by a new bankruptcy
action or the seller forced to settle his claim for some fraction
of the dollar. Time magazine observes that “bankruptcies are
highest in states that permit creditors to garnishee a hefty
slice of debtors’ salaries.”10 One Montana attorney advised that
his clients would not be dissuaded from taking bankruptcy;
they panicked when their wages were garnished and they
were left with too little income for basic food and shelter needs.
When we compare the performance of various sectors of the
economy (Table 7), it does appear that consumers have been
relatively irresponsible. Noncorporate and individual debt did
increase 462.9 percent over the period 1946-1962.20 However
"Time, February 22, 1963, p. 44.
"Ibid., p. 44.
“The reader may also recall that the increase of consumer credit by
itself, not including professional and farmer debt, was 655 percent.
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TABLE 7
NET PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DEBT, UNITED STATES,
1946-1962
(billions of dollars)

Net Private Debt
Net Public Debt
Non-Corporate
State
Year1
and Individual Corporate
and Local Federal
1946 __________ ___
60.6
13.6
229.7
93.5
1947 __________ ___
223.3
70.8
108.9
14.4
1948 __________ ___
216.5
83.1
16.2
117.8
1949 __________ ___
93.7
218.6
118.0
18.1
1950 _____ ____ ___
218.7
108.8
142.1
20.7
1951................. ___
218.5
119.7
162.5
23.3
1952 ____
222.9
135.5
25.8
171.0
1953 ________
150.3
179.5
28.6
228.1
1954 .............
230.2
165.6
33.4
182.8
1955 ________ ___
231.5
190.4
212.1
38.4
1956 .........
225.4
42.7
___
207.7
231.7
1957 ...........
224.4
221.1
46.7
246.7
1958
______
232.7
239.4
50.9
259.5
1959 ............
243.2
267.0
55.6
281.5
1960 ................
241.0
288.3
60.0
294.8
1961 _____ ___ ___
248.1
312.3
65.0
311.5
1962 .................. .
256.8
341.1
72.0
330.8
% Increase,
1946-1962
+ 11.8
___
+462.9
+429.4
+253.8
*As of December 31.
Source: Economic Report of the President, January 1963, Tables C-52
and C-53, pp. 234-35.

this stricture is tempered when we also observe that net state
and local debt rose nearly as much (429.4 percent). Business
obligations also rose significantly, reaching a level more than
two and one-half times as great in 1962 as in 1946.21 It may sur
prise many to realize that net federal debt has grown so mod
estly (11.8 percent) during the same interval.
fflCarl Reiser, “The Great Credit Pump,” Fortune, February, 1963,
122-157:
One of the most significant and least discussed statistics in
the U.S. economy is the total of outstanding trade credit, the
short-term credit that business extends to business. Estimates
put it at nearly $10 billion more than the entire federal budget
for 1963, some $20 billion more than the total value of all U.S.
corporate bonds outstanding at the end of 1961, and about two
and a half times the gross national product of Canada. It is in

pp*
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Let us return to the question of what moral issue is involved
with regard to consumers. Business executives who borrow for
their firms are also consumers; voter-taxpayers are also con
sumers. A corporation borrows whenever it feels that this
money can be put to use in generating revenues sufficient to
pay back the principal, plus the costs of borrowing and yield
some net contribution to profits. The voter approves higher
tax burdens (and debt) when he values the services that gov
ernments can provide (for example, education or highways)
more than the money given up in taxes. Similarly, consumers
seem willing to mortgage the future (the hereafter, too,
according to some critics) in order to consume now. They
heavily discount the benefits of higher future income flows
relative to the purchase and enjoyment of goods and services
today. But this is possible only through the acquiescence of
financial and business creditors. If the consumer debt level is
the neighborhood of $100 billion. But even more dramatic than
its sheer size is its growth rate. In the decade between
1951 and 1961, while the U.S. gross national product, measured
ni current dollars, grew 58 percent and nationwide sales grew
37 percent, trade credit expanded by just about 100 percent.
(p. 122)
In some areas of business, creditors have already begun to
sense the need for caution. In retailing, the great discount revo
lution . . . has produced a number of new operators who are
skating on very thin ice. Typically, many discounters use trade
credit to finance growth; they buy goods on credit, turn the
goods over, put the money into new goods and stores, and count
on a further fast turnover to pay off their suppliers. Turnover is
the key to discount operation, and it gives the discounter a
considerable power over suppliers, who are so eager to get the
discounters' volume business that they are willing to extend
credit well beyond the limits of prudence indicated by the
retailer's assets and working capital. According to Dun and
Bradstreet, which regularly surveys some 200 discounters, the
median figure for discount stores showed current assets
at one and a half times debt in 1961. (Department stores, by
contrast, had current assets of roughly three and a half times
debt.) There has been a disturbing number of bankruptcies
among discounters, and some suppliers are trying to tighten up
credit terms, (p. 148)
A big aluminum company reports that, in 1962, 29 percent of
its trade accounts were overdue as against only 15 percent in
1955. The average age of receivables held by a major electrical
manufacturer, to take another example, has jumped from forty
days to more than fifty in the past five years, (p. 148)
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too high and if losses are too great, both parties to the contract
are culpable.
If we can say that consumer borrowers borrow too much (the
corollary is that lenders lend too much), what can and should
be done to limit credit and reduce bankruptcies? Several rem
edies should be explored. One would be to raise the price of
eligibility for bankruptcy. Involuntary bankruptcy can be ini
tiated by creditors when as little as $1,000 is owed; while the
general price level has been steadily rising for many years, the
entrance fee to bankruptcy court has remained the same. For
a sum that is only half what many people borrow when buying
a new car, the individual can be declared a bankrupt. A recent
news item presented some interesting data on this problem.22
It noted that eight individuals (or households) had filed bank
ruptcy actions in the Federal Court in Butte, Montana. Total
liabilities were shown to be $49,752 (average $6,219) and total
assets were $2,650 (average $331). However, the six smaller
liability actions had total liabilities of only $14,651 (average
$2,441) and total assets of $2,300 (average $383, which is higher
than the average for all, above). Of the latter group, one peti
tioner had a net debt of only $738! If the eligibility figure were
higher, say $3,000, many fewer would be eligible, and there
would be a more realistic warning signal to merchants and
other lenders. As it is, most of us now are potential bankrupts;
with a higher limit, the lender might be more cautious if he
notes from the loan or credit application that this purchase
pushes the customer into the bankrupt-eligible class.23
“The Missoulian, Missoula, Montana, June 23, 1963, p. 16.
“The Bankruptcy Act, 7th Ed., Foundation Press, Inc., 1961, Chapter 3,
Section 3 (11 U. S. C. § 21), p. 13.
The delinquent borrowers must, however, commit one of the
six acts of bankruptcy: Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall
consist of his having (1) concealed, removed, or permitted to
be concealed or removed any part of his property, with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of them, or made
or suffered a transfer of any of his property, fraudulent under
the provisions of section 67 or 70 of this Act; or (2) made or
suffered a preferential transfer, as defined in subdivision (a)
of section 60 of this Act; or (3) suffered or permitted, while
insolvent, any creditor to obtain a lien upon any of his property
through legal proceedings or distraint and not having vacated
or discharged such lien within thirty days from the date thereof
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If there is no change in the eligibility price as discussed
above, more use should be made of Chapter XIII of the bank
ruptcy act which encourages and implements a plan for repayCHART II
PERCENT OF SPENDING UNITS COMMITTED TO VARIOUS
AMOUNTS OF INSTALMENT CREDIT PAYMENTS AS A PERCENT
OF DISPOSABLE INCOME, BY INCOME LEVEL, 1962
PERCENT
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(Survey Research Center of the U niversity of M ichigan),
Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact
Chart 23, p. 38.
or at least five days before the date set for any sale or other
disposition of such property; or (4) made a general assignment
for the benefit of his creditors; or (5) while insolvent or unable
to pay his debts as they m ature, procured, perm itted, or suffered
voluntarily or involuntarily the appointm ent of a receiver or
trustee to take charge of his property; or (6) adm itted in w riting
his inability to pay his debts and his willingness to be adjudged
a bankrupt.

42

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

BANKRUPTCY CAUSES AND REMEDIES

43

ment out of earnings. (Discussion of this option is handled in
Part II of this study.)
Table 8 shows the concentration of borrowers in the no- or
low-asset classes, which is not unexpected. Wealthy persons
do not often need to borrow; poor persons must borrow if they
are to consume. What is surprising is the amount of instalment
debt incurred by those with no liquid assets; for example, 15
percent of all spending units with no liquid assets owe from
$500 to $1,999 in instalment debt. Twenty-three percent of the
spending units with liquid assets of $99 or less owe from $1,000
to $1,999; eight percent owe more than $2,000! The responsi
bility of lenders to evaluate borrowers’ repayment chances is
CHART III
PERCENT OF SPENDING UNITS COMMITTED TO VARIOUS
AMOUNTS OF INSTALMENT CREDIT PAYMENTS AS A
PERCENT OF DISPOSABLE INCOME, BY AGE GROUP, 1962

Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact
Yearbook. (Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan),
Chart 24, p. 39.
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well accepted. But Table 8 illustrates the creditor’s dilemma;
the typical instalment buyer is wanting in financial resources.
Of the various disposable income levels (see Chart II), the
group with $10,000 or more per year contains the greatest pro
portion of individuals whose instalment payments constitute
10 percent or less of income; the $7,500 to $9,999 group has the
greatest proportion of individuals making payments of 20-39
percent; but the income level with the greatest proportion of
instalment payments equal to 40 percent or more of income,
is the group in the under $2,000 range. The $7,500 to $9,999
group had a greater proportion of its total spending units
engaged in some degree of instalment buying.
By age group (Chart III), the greatest users of instalment
contracts are the spending units in the age range of 25-34 years.
This is a natural consequence of family formation and home
buying. What is significant in this chart is the very substan
tial proportion of high instalment payments in the 18-24 age
group. Chart IV is a vulnerability comparison, by spending
unit income levels (which, however, indirectly reflect age
and liquid asset holdings).24 The alarming number of vulner
able credit users in the income range of $3,000 to $7,499 should
be noted, especially by those who extend credit.
In addition to watching carefully the age, income level, assets,
and current debt of customers, Montana merchants should also
“National Consumer Finance Association, op. cit., pp. 38-39:
The following criteria were used: 1) repayment of instalment
debts at current rate would take more than one year, 2) $200 or
less of liquid assets, 3) personal instalment debt repayments
more than 20 percent of annual income. Characteristics 1 and 2
placed the family with instalment debt in the “vulnerable”
category. If the third characteristic was also present, the family
was considered “very vulnerable” to any financial reverse.
Mortgage debt and non-instalment debt are excluded.
Based on these criteria, the percentage in the “vulnerable”
group in 1959 varied from a high of 9 percent in the income
levels of $4,000 to $4,999 annually, where some 56 percent
were making instalment credit payments, to a low of 1 percent
in the $10,000 and over income group, where some 37 percent
were making instalment credit payments. Those in the “very
vulnerable” group varied from a high of 9 percent in the $3,000
to $3,999 category, where some 52 percent were making instal
ment payments, to a low of 1 percent in the $10,000 and over
category.
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CHART IV
ALL SPENDING UNITS COMMITTED TO INSTALMENT
CREDIT PAYMENTS AND THEIR VULNERABILITY TO
FINANCIAL REVERSES. BY INCOME LEVEL, 1959
PERCENT
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Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact
Yearbook. (Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan),
Chart 25, p. 39.

verify employment and income. It will probably be necessary
for merchants to take the lead in keeping their patrons out of
trouble, since to rely on borrowers to change their behavior is
probably naive.
There are other ways to limit or reduce losses. Undoubtedly,
more merchants could specify a down payment, or increase the
size of the payment required without a loss of desirable cus
tomers. Perhaps some may be able to make a charge for credit,

46

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

BANKRUPTCY CAUSES AND REMEDIES

47

48

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

to discourage opportunists that exploit this financing service
when it is free. (Credit is never actually free, but is frequently
subsidized by the cash buyer who pays the same prices for
goods. A cost of credit exists whether a charge for it is directly
made or not.) Possibly some restraint could be exercised in
offering credit via advertising or other communications to pro
spective customers. Effectiveness in present credit strategy is
a double-edged sword — it usually brings in the “no-pays” and
the “slow pays” as well as the prompt-pay customers.
Finally, many American merchants must put their own
houses in order before they moralize about consumer behavior.
In the Fortune article cited above it may be recalled that busi
ness debt has been rising dramatically. This often creates pres
sure to liquidate inventories; while discount houses take the
price-cutting alternative, many traditional merchants accept
poor credit risks at full-margin prices. While this is not the
time or place to debate this retailing phenomenon, at least it can
be observed that the discounter typically gets cash (for the
repayment of his obligations) and not an open account of pos
sibly dubious worth.
In summary, we have found that bankruptcies have increased
rapidly since World War II. In looking for causes of non
business bankruptcies, we have rejected population changes,
income changes, numbers of attorneys, and numbers of retail
ers as major factors. We have not had the time to examine
other elements of merchant competition (changes in market
shares, for example), and various sociological and psychological
influences that may well have a bearing on the problem. There
is some evidence, however, that consumer credit (offered and
accepted) plays a principal role in determining how many citi
zens will petition for bankruptcy.
We have discussed several areas where merchants might
take action to lessen the number of delinquent debtors and to
control more effectively the amount of borrowing. These sug
gestions are of limited value though, in dealing with today’s
over-extended creditor. For the handling of that problem, Part
II should be of interest to the reader.

PART II

Bankruptcy Causes and Remedies
GEORGE L. MITCHELL
Instructor, Business Administration
Montana State University, Missoula

Let’s Not Go Bankrupt!
In the last half century, the American attitude toward bank
ruptcy appears to have changed radically. The pendulum of
society’s judgment has swung from the unconscionable sever
ity mentioned by Blackstone to a point where the stigma of fail
ure has been virtually removed, both by social inclination and
by legislative design.1 Seemingly, none of the changes which
accompanied the evolution from severity to sympathy or sanc
tion have provided an answer for the problem of the debtor
who cannot make his creditors whole again.
The problem seems to be one of fulfilling the social need met
by bankruptcy legislation without incurring those ills which
invariably accompany such an act. That Congress has passed
four Bankruptcy Acts would seem to indicate that the prob
lems in the absence of such legislation are even greater than
those which accompany it, and that repeal offers no lasting
solution. Thus, if the history of bankruptcy law and the statis
tics pertaining to the administration thereof are a valid indica
tion, the Bankruptcy Act will not only continue to exist but
, will grow in the scope of its application. As noted in Part I, the
majority of present day bankruptcies are voluntary and are
. filed by wage earners.2 It is with this segment of the total bank
ruptcy problem that the remainder of this article will deal.
The American Bar Association has established a new com’Theodore Sager Meth, “Ethical and Economic Considerations in Chapter
X III Proceedings,” Journal of the National Association of Referees in
Bankruptcy, April 1962, Vol. 36, No. 2.
“Charles H enry Rudolph, Jr., “B ankruptcy — C hapter X III Wage E arn
er’s Plans,” West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64 (1961-62), p. 217.
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mittee to study the causes for the high incidence of nonbusiness
or employee type bankruptcy. Nevertheless, there are some
factors which, though they may defy classification in terms
of relative importance, are sufficiently apparent to be recog
nized as causes of the problem. Certain business practices fall
within this category. The creditor titillates the consumer’s
“buying nerve” with highly developed advertising, the mer
chandising department displays the wares in the most attrac
tive fashion, the credit department grants credit easily, often
with little or no investigation due to the lack of facilities or
cost of such procedure;, then when the consumer defaults, the
creditor is filled with righteous indignation.
There is no denying the importance of “credit.” It, perhaps
more than anything else, has been responsible for the develop
ment of our industrial power and our technological advance
ment. Yet the increasing competition for the consumer dollar
has led to practices which permit the consumer to purchase
on credit with a facility which is partially responsible for the
current rise in number of wage earner bankruptcies.
The responsibility is not the creditor’s alone. The debtor is
to some extent a victim of his creditors, because of his vulner
ability to advertising, his susceptibility to the blandishments
of an acquisitive society, and his lack of enough business
sophistication to make and keep a sensible budget. But, even
in the case of a debtor who does not actually practice decep
tion or make fraudulent conveyances or otherwise attempt to
frustrate creditors, one can question the integrity of an indi
vidual who incurs debts which he cannot rationally expect to
pay.
The magnitude of the effect to which these and other causes
lead is adequately reflected by the statistical analysis pre
sented. When considered in terms of the individual debtor, the
impact is mostly personal in nature. His relationship with
friends and the community and his anxiety over the welfare
of his family as well as his regard for himself and his own
capabilities best illustrate this facet of the problem. The impact
on the creditor, on the other hand, depends upon the type of
creditor and upon his relationship to the debtor. The loss may
merely result in an adjustment in the “reserve for bad debts,”
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thus diminishing the impact by its tax treatment, or the impact
may be lessened by dispersing the loss among individual stock
holders, or it may be felt very deeply by one dependent upon
payment or by a friend. Whatever the immediate impact upon
individual businesses or persons of the failure of the debtor
to pay, the problem on a national scale assumes gigantic pro
portions, and it is growing in dimension.
Any solution to this problem must consider the possibilities
of dealing with it at its source. Wage earners cannot over
extend their credit without the help of creditors. Yet to elim
inate the great and complex system of credit upon which the
commercial world is so dependent is impracticable. What are
the available alternatives? First, creditors could simply recog
nize the risks inherent in easy extension of credit to achieve
volume sales, and assume those risks. Calculated increases in
“reserves,” more extensive use of security devices such as con
ditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages to improve their
position in the event of default, coupled with a general regard
for such losses as a business expense would all tend to lessen
the impact. The problem would then be one of determining
the point of diminishing return in such a policy. Another alter
native may be to impose some restriction upon the extension
of credit. Such restriction could come from within by creating
better facilities for the investigation of credit standings or the
maintenance of cumulative and current records. The question
then would be whether the expenses of creating and maintain
ing such facilities would justify their continued existence and
perfection.
Restrictions upon the extension of credit could also be im
posed from without. On September 1, 1941, federal regulation
I of consumer credit (known as Regulation “W”) was adopted
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Its
;. main objective was to reduce the volume of consumer credit
so as to lessen inflation and pressure during war time. It pro
vided for one-third down-payment of the purchase price and
limited the extent of the time for payment. The national maga
zine Business Week reported, four years after the adoption of
Regulation “W,” that as of that date not only had consumer
credit halved in amount, but that retail sales had increased.
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Retailers are divided in opinion as to whether a peacetime
economy would yield similar results, and whether Regulation
“W i n some substantially similar form, should be reinstated
now.
An additional means may be to explore the possibility of
reducing the number of straight bankruptcies (those which
result in present liquidation of assets and discharge). Because
the debtor may proceed under the provisions for straight bank
ruptcy if he so desires, and because the lures of expediency, low
cost, and ultimate discharge are strong, any attempt to induce
the debtor to take another course of action would have to
include a reasonable alternative.
A brief discussion of the alternatives which are currently
available to a debtor who cannot pay his debts in Montana
may lend itself to a better understanding of why so many
choose voluntarily to petition for bankruptcy.
First, there is the Common Law Composition. While there
is no statutory provision for such agreements, they are recog
nized by the courts as valid under the Common Law.3 Such a
composition is an agreement between the debtor and his credit
ors whereby the creditors take in proportion to the amount
owed to them a part of their claims and the debtor is discharged
from the balance, since the whole amount is deemed satisfied
by payment of the part. One disadvantage of such an agree
ment is that it is contractual in nature and is dependent for its
success upon the voluntary consent of all the creditors, for only
the claims of creditors who voluntarily consent to the compo
sition and thereby voluntarily release the balance of their
claims are precluded from bringing suit for the balance due.
Another disadvantage of the composition is the fact that any
creditor can attach the assets of the debtor during the usual
period of bargaining and negotiation which precedes the execu
tion of the composition agreement.
Second, there is a statutory alternative available to the debtor
in the form of an assignment for the benefit of creditors.4 Such
an assignment is a transfer of all of the debtor’s assets, save
Pioneer Mineral Corp. vs. Larabie Bros. Bankers, Inc., Montana Re
ports, Vol. 99, p. 358.
‘Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Title 18, Chapter 3, Vol. 2.
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those things specifically exempted by statute, to an assignee
in trust, or trustee, who applies the property to the payment of
the debtor’s debts on a pro rata basis.5 Unlike the composition,
the assignment for the benefit of creditors does not require
the consent of the creditors.0 Also, it halts the race of diligent
creditors in their attempt to acquire prior rights in the debtor’s
assets by immunizing them from execution and attachment.
But, since the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from
impairing the obligation of a contract between private citizens,
the statute cannot force all creditors to discharge the debtor
upon pro rata distribution of the assets. Thus, the debtor,
though he has parted with all of his assets save those exempted
by statute, remains liable to the full extent of any balance due
after pro rata distribution of said assets and is denied a
discharge.
Third, the debtor may choose to proceed under the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act. The disadvantages inherent in the
alternatives provided at the Common Law and State Statutory
level lead many to choose to proceed under the terms of this
Act. Often the debtor is seeking only to relieve himself from
the harassment of garnishment or attachment proceedings, or
letters of debt-complaint to his employer, which often result
in the debtor’s losing his job. Under the Bankruptcy Act he
is not dependent upon the consent of his creditors; nor is the
federal government, as are the states, precluded from granting
him a discharge by any constitutional provision against the
impairment of contracts.
What, then, could be presented to the debtor as an alterna
tive sufficiently attractive to induce him to take some course
of action other than straight bankruptcy? A growing number
of experts in the field of bankruptcy law feel that a substantial
portion of the annual loss due to no-asset bankruptcies might
be salvaged through broader and more effective use of a pro
vision of the Bankruptcy Act itself which has been in the law
since September 22, 1938. This provision has received little
attention compared to the straight bankruptcy provisions.
“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Sections 18-301 to 18-330.
“Pioneer Mineral Corp., et al., op. cit., p. 358.
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Only fourteen Districts of the United States have utilized this
method in more than 15 percent of their employee-type cases
over the ten-year period of 1952-1961 inclusive.7 The provision
of which I speak is the Chapter XIII proceeding, or, as it is
often called, “the wage-earner plan.”
The wage earner plan provides for a composition or exten
sion, or both, agreed to by a majority in number and amount of
the creditors, and confirmed by the bankruptcy court. Thus it is
made binding upon all creditors, even the minority who did
not agree. According to the plan, payment is made out of the
debtor’s future earnings or wages, and all action by diligent
creditors against the debtor are stayed during the term of the
plan. Straight bankruptcy does not deal with the debtor’s ability
to earn or pay in the future and thus it eliminates time, the very
essence of credit transactions. A Chapter XIII proceeding per
mits the debtor first to surrender relatively valuable, but ines
sential assets, and then embark upon a program of paymentout-of-earnings which will not be of so great duration as to
destroy his incentive. The debtor submits his future earnings
to court control and the court thereafter makes an equitable
distribution, through a trustee, to the creditors. Should the
debtor be unable to meet his commitments according to the
plan in a Chapter XIII proceeding, he may petition to be adjudi
cated a bankrupt under Section 666 (2) of the Act.
It should be pointed out that the alternative route through
the wage earner plan is not the simplest nor the easiest for any
of the parties concerned. For the debtor it means added
expense, for it is he who must pay his attorney, the trustee,
and the cost of the action. It is the debtor who chooses to add
this additional expense to his other financial problems in order
to pay his bills. For the debtor’s attorney it means more involve
ment and time expended at a much lower rate of return than
that which is provided by any of a multitude of other more
lucrative activities. For a trustee, appointed by the court, to
be assured of equitable distribution of the wage earner’s in
come requires continued supervision and recognition of changTteginald W. McDuffee, “Wage E arner (Chapter X III) Proceedings in
the Bankruptcy Court,” The Business Lawyer, April 1962, Vol. XVII,
No. 3, p. 680.
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ing circumstances. The referee must be dedicated to the con
cept of rehabilitation, the employer must be amenable to this
type of relief, and the debtor himself must have enough
income to more than meet his needs and have a strong desire
to pay his debts. It has been said that the essential elements
for a successful Chapter XIII proceeding are:
1. A debtor with a job who desires to pay all or part of his
debts and who will budget his living expenses to apply
part of his future earnings to the payment of the past due
claims.
2. Creditors who are willing to extend the time for payment
of, or reduce the amount of, their claims, or both, to help
rehabilitate the debtor.
3. The power in the courts to protect the debtor from cred
itors attempting to seize debtor’s assets or force payment;
to permit payments to a trustee for pro-rata distribution
to creditors; and to allow the debtor the use of his neces
sary property in order to carry out his budgeted program
and retain his job.
4. An attorney familiar with Chapter XIII proceedings to
advise and help the debtor prepare a plan acceptable to
creditors and with resourcefulness to help him with his
problems during the time the plan is in effect.8
In addition, the wage earner plan requires the debtor to
relinquish his income over an extended period of time; whereas
a discharge in straight bankruptcy not only relieves him of
past obligations, but imposes no obligation upon his future
income.
Yet, despite these and other difficulties, use of the wage
earner plan is on the increase in many districts. To some extent
this is due to the desire of the debtors to pay their debts. One
experienced referee in bankruptcy is firmly convinced that
75 percent or more of the wage earners really desire to pay
their debts if afforded an opportunity, and especially if skilled
“Wesley E. Brown, “A P rim er on W age-Earner Plans U nder Chapter
X III of the B ankruptcy Act,” The Business Lawyer, A pril 1962, Vol.
XVII, No. 3.
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assistance is available.9 This commendable desire on the part
of such debtors might be used to better advantage if the wage
earner plan were more strongly advocated and if professional
assistance were made less expensive and more readily available.
This presents a problem of educating all the potential parties
to such a proceeding. Many debtors are not aware that such a
plan exists, and, believing straight bankruptcy to be the only
solution to their problems, present an attorney with a request
that he file a bankruptcy petition on their behalf. Many attor
neys are equally unaware of the wage earner plan, and others
simply fail to advise the debtor of its availability and comply
with the debtor’s request to file the bankruptcy petition in
order to avoid the additional complexity of proceeding under
Chapter XIII. Many attorneys understandably prefer to utilize
the straight bankruptcy proceeding because it may be accom
plished with great facility; whereas the Chapter XIII proceed
ing requires that they formulate a plan agreeable to the credit
ors and present it in an acceptable manner, and further, must
continually advise their client during the pendency of the
proceedings. The relatively low rate of return for time spent
and continued effort expended leads many attorneys to prefer
more compensating endeavors.
It cannot be expected that the attorney should become a
social engineer or counselor in family finance, anymore than
it can be expected that the referee in bankruptcy or the credit
ors of the debtor themselves should undertake such an onerous
task. But the process of education need not cease with univer
sal awareness of the wage earner plan as an existing, practical
and advantageous alternative to straight bankruptcy. That
there are plans available to treat the financial illness of insolv
ency is not enough. Such proceedings, under any Chapter,
should be schools of practical economics for the noncommercial
community. The Chairman of the Consumer Bankruptcy Com
mittee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association, Referee Miles C. Riley,
has said, “Persons in financial distress now contact their attor“Miles C. Riley, Referee, “Chapter XIIIs in the Madison Bankruptcy
Court,” Journal of the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy,
April, 1963, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 55.
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neys who file petitions for them, usually for adjudication and
to obtain a discharge. The bankrupt plods his way to discharge
or denial and goes on without being skillfully advised as to why
he became financially distressed or what he should do in the
future .. .”10 The cure would seem to lie in instruction. A source
of expert assistance readily available to debtors, attorneys,
creditors, and referees alike could be the medicine to effect
such a cure. Such a source is not presently available in a vast
majority of the jurisdictions and the burden of any amount of
instruction which is given falls upon those who quite under
standably have neither the time, facilities, nor the inclination
to bear that burden.
One district, plagued with the same universal problems,
actively sought a solution. The Court has employed an expert
counselling staff which is made available to both the attorneys
and the debtors throughout the entire Chapter XIII proceed
ings, for advice and assistance. They make no claim to the
discovery of a panacea which dissolved problems overnight,
but they have discovered that the plan works and that the fol
lowing advantages result from the use thereof:

Advantages to the attorneys who initiate the proceeding
(a) the attorney does not bear the full burden of formulat
ing the debtor’s proposal;
(b) he can obtain more efficient and expedient relief for
his client;
(c) he need not continuously advise his client during the
pendency of the proceeding;
(d) his fee is collected by the bankruptcy court and he may
avail himself of the assistance of the counselling staff if
he so desires.

Advantages to the debtors
(a) lower cost of relief and amortized payments thereof;
(b) continuous aid and advice by expert counselling staff;
(c) protection from repossessions and other attempts of
10Meth, op. cit., p. 45.
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creditors to seize debtor’s assets, and cessation of gar
nishment of wages or dunning notices which may cost
debtor his job;
(d) fulfillment of debtor’s desire to pay debts;
(e) education of debtor in budgeting and family finance
which could avert repetitive insolvency.
Advantages to the creditors
(a) payment, which though in installments is better than
the risk of only a small partial payment or no payment
at all which is so often the case in straight bankruptcy
proceedings by wage earners;
(b) the bankruptcy court acts as his collection agent.11
That the use of the counselling staff to facilitate use of the
wage earner plan has paid dividends during the short period
since its inception in the Madison District in mid-1960 is evi
denced by the amounts paid to the creditors thereunder. In
1960 creditors were paid $2,153; in 1961, they were paid $30,163;
and in excess of $100,000 was paid in 1962. Creditors who once
favored immediate liquidation of the debtor’s assets have grown
to appreciate the potential of a plan which recognizes earning
power as well as assets and which assists debtors in fulfilling
their moral obligations.
Though the wage earner plan has been in the law since 1938,
it is only recently that its real potential has come to light,
though for years the Judicial Conference of the United States
has advocated its use and effectiveness. The Consumer Bank
ruptcy Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association has appointed
a sub-committee to arrange and encourage workshops, sem
inars, and forums and to publish papers designed to educate
those who should be concerned with the merits of the Chap
ter XIII proceeding.
The National Bankruptcy Conference, the National Associa
tion of Referees in Bankruptcy, and others have joined the
Judicial Conference of the United States and the American
“Riley, op. cit., p. 56.
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Bar Association in recognizing the importance of the Chapter
XIII proceeding. It may be that Chapter XIII has come into
its own at last, and that a combination of exigency, ingenuity
and time will shape the application of the wage earner plan
into a solution for the problem which has been bothering the
commercial world since long before the advent of written laws.

What Everybody Wants to Know
About Deficit Spending
“This is a doubtful tale from faery land,
Hard for the non-elect to understand.”
John Keats, Lamia
ROBERT F. WALLACE, Chairman
Department of Economics
Montana State University, Missoula

When the Practical Man reads that the President’s proposed
tax cut is purposely planned to create a deliberate budgetary
deficit, he is quite naturally puzzled. Such a proposal violates
common sense. Surely no individual or household can spend
itself rich; nor can it continue forever to incur deficits which
result in an ever larger debt which is never to be repaid. Yet
for the whole nation, strange as it may seem, exactly the oppo
site is true. A nation can enrich itself only by spending. More
over, if a nation’s deficits are too small and its total debts, both
public and private, grow too slowly, that nation’s income, out
put, and employment will surely decline. Actual reduction in
total debt would result in major disaster. This occurred in the
United States on a grand scale only from 1930 to 1933, the per
iod known as The Great Depression. By contrast, from 1946 to
1962, an era of unequalled prosperity, our total debt increased
from less than $400 billion to more than $1,000 billion.1
These are not opinions, but rather the elementary facts of
our national accounts, the ABC’s of economics. But the unfor
tunate situation is that most people have not had an opportun
ity to study the relevant relationships in a systematic fashion;
nor are they familiar with the sources of statistical informa
tion which would enable them to test impressions and opin
ions against facts. The result is that popular concepts, at vari
ance with readily verifiable facts, interfere with meaningful
’See Table 1.
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discussion of this crucial problem of public policy. For exam
ple, the popular conception of recent trends in Federal debt
may perhaps be fairly described as follows: While private
businesses and individuals have been conducting their finan
cial affairs in a generally careful and circumspect manner,
uncontrolled Government spending, especially at the Federal
level, has caused huge deficits resulting in what Time magazine
calls, “the bloating national debt.”2
Some of the facts as opposed to popular concepts, are shown
in Table 1. There it may be seen that from 1946 to 1962, net
private debt of corporations and individuals increased by 336
percent, while net Federal debt increased by 12 percent. A 429
percent increase in state and local debt suggests that if any
public debt has been out of control it is the debt of the folks
back home and not that incurred by the Bureaucrats in Wash
ington. And, in daily references to “crushing taxes,” how often
does the press remind us that the only tax rates that have not
been raised since the war, the only tax rates that have actually
been reduced, are those of the Federal Government for gen
eral revenue? Yet such are the facts as contrasted with the
TABLE 1
SOME COMPARISONS OF DEBT, 1946-1962
(billions of dollars)
^
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^January 25,1963, p. 12.
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folklore. The result is that public debate of planned deficit
spending seldom involves the real issues.
The frequently absurd pronouncements of the Practical Man
are received by professional economists with feelings ranging
all the way from tolerant amusement to despair, depending
on the prominence of the speaker. The Practical Man, drawing
on the usually reliable lessons of personal experience, seeks
to relate national conduct to principles which are unquestion
ably valid in the management of a household, or a corner gro
cery store. He sees in the opposing position, at best, mater
ial for ridicule and, at worst, moral decay. Like Henny Penny
who, according to nursery tradition, panicked the other barn
yard fowls with her cry, “The sky is falling,” he has been
shouting in the streets for thirty years that our financial skies
are falling, or at least in danger of falling. But unlike Ducky
Lucky and Turkey Lurkey, his listeners have paid no atten
tion whatever to his warning. Meanwhile disaster has appeared
to recede into the distance as the nation grows steadily in
wealth and income. Evidently other more pragmatic men are
willing to accept present bliss at the cost of eventual perdition,
especially since the day of reckoning seems indefinitely postponeable.
The most unfortunate aspect of the situation is not merely
that formal logical error invalidates the particular objections
which the Practical Man chooses to make, though this is
usually the case. The pity is that he is wrong when he might
he right, that he makes little if any contribution when there is
much that he could contribute. Economic analysis reveals that
there may be valid grounds for his objections, or at least that
there may be other solutions which could remove or minimize
the economic stagnation which is the heart of the problem.
But unfamiliarity with relevant principles causes him to
make the wrong objections on the wrong grounds and involves
him in gross logical error which his professional adversaries
are not slow to point out. Thus his considerable ability is wasted
on false issues while important questions of public policy are
neglected or at least not related to the matter of Federal defi
cits to which they may be highly relevant. Our friend has
brought down no birds these thirty years, for the simple
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reason that he has been firing blanks! But the birds are there.
In this article the reader is asked to lay aside temporarily the
value judgments drawn from personal experience and, for the
sake of analysis, to look at the world from what may be an
unfamiliar point of view. Like the churchmen who were out
raged by Galileo’s denial that the sun moves around the earth,
he may feel that he is being asked not to believe his own eyes.
What, then, is this strange logic? How can we spend ourselves
rich? How can unending deficits and their consequence, ever
growing debts, be essential to the economic health of a nation?

The Role of Spending
We begin with a simple fact on which all can agree. Our real
national income in any given year can be no more than the
total of all the goods and services produced during that year.
We call it our gross national product, or simply GNP. In order
to measure the product we could conceivably take an inven
tory and list it item by item. But the bewildering variety and
astronomical numbers involved would soon demonstrate the
impracticability of this method. We might try weighing every
thing or perhaps estimating cubic content, but such reckoning
would, of course, be meaningless. The only meaningful measure
is in dollars and cents. We only ask, “What was paid for it?”
Thus at the very outset we see an essential relation between
total output and total spending. Spending is our measure of
output. Output is defined in terms of spending. But the rela
tionship goes deeper. There is a causal connection. Spending
creates or causes output since it is clear that nobody produces
anything in a free market system, unless he is paid for it. And
here another key relationship becomes apparent. Spending
creates income as well as output. Nobody can receive money
income unless someone else has spent money. The fundamental
relationships can therefore be summarized by the undeniable
proposition that spending creates income and output. They can
be generated in no other way. Spending is just another word
for what economists call “demand.” What businessmen call
“sales” (their source of income) obviously depends on the
spending of their customers.

64

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

Recognition of these basic facts immediately throws a dif
ferent light on national spending habits. When we see the
statement that the American people are on a sort of spree,
spending more and more every year, this is no cause for alarm.
On the contrary, we can only breathe a fervent, “Thank
Heaven!” For if our total spending stops growing, our produc
tion and sales stop growing. The nation stops growing.
These are the fundamental accounting principles on the
basis of which national income and output are measured by
the United States Department of Commerce and by the gov
ernments of all nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain. If the
reader picks up a copy of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, availTABLE 2
NATIONAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE, 1962
(billions of dollars)
Income Receipts
Compensation of employees ..............................................
Proprietors’ income _______________________________________
Business and professional __________
36.8
F a r m ---------------------------------------------13.0
Rental income of p erso n s_____________________________
Corporate p r o fits _________________ ______ _________ ___
Net in te r e st_______________________________________
Capital consumption allow an ce_____________________________
Indirect business tax lia b ility ______________________________
Business transfer payments ___________
Statistical discrepancy and adjustm ents________________
Charges against Gross National Product (Gross National
I n c o m e ) ---------------------------------------- ...___ ;________ ...
Expenditures
Personal consumption expenditure .......
Goods ------------------------------;_______________________ 209.5
S ervices_____ ______________
147.1
Gross private in vestm en t...............................................
Domestic ____________________________________
76.6
F o r e ig n ______________________________
”
33
Government purchases of goods and serv ices...... .............
Federal _____________________________________
62.3
State and lo c a l________________________________ ___
55 0
Gross National Product or Expenditure_______________

49
12.8
51.0

2.1
—4.8
553.9
356.7

117.3

553.9

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1963,
260-261.

pp.
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able at every national bank, or the Survey of Current Business,
found in most libraries, he can himself verify the procedures
described here. He will find the GNP table labeled “Gross
National Product or Expenditure.”
It is convenient for analytical purposes to separate the total
spending into three classes: (1) spending by consumers for
consumer goods and services, (2) spending by investors for
additions to our real capital wealth and, (3) spending by Gov
ernment for goods and services. The total spending represents
payment for the gross national product and can be traced to
the various recipients as income, or, alternatively, as charges
against the total output. As an example, the actual record for
the United States in 1962 is shown in Table 2, which presents
a highly simplified summary of the national income and prod
uct accounts for that year.

The Role of Deficit Spending and Debt
Having demonstrated the point that a nation can get rich
only by spending—in fact under a free market system could
not produce so much as a toothpick without spending—we
must now show the extent to which spending in turn depends
on deficits and growing debt. We shall demonstrate the fact
that spending, which creates income and output, cannot be
maintained without continuing deficits. At the outset, in order
to clarify general principles, we shall consider not merely Fed
eral Government deficits, but total deficits, including Govern
ment. The Government is only one of many possible deficit
spenders among the various economic units. In fact, as pointed
out earlier, its deficits since World War II have represented
only a tiny proportion of total deficits of all economic units.
After analyzing the deficit operations of economic units—indi
viduals, business enterprises, and Government—we may then
ask what special characteristics, if any, may be attributed to
those of the Federal Government.
We start with the proposition that the income of each and
every economic unit is the result of spending by other units
and that the aggregate income of all economic units is there
fore equal to the total spending of a given period, say a year.
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With the exception of a negligibly few economic units whose
income in a given period is exactly equal to expenditure all
units can be divided into two classes, surplus units and deficit
units. Since the operations of the few “balanced budget” units
are completely neutral in their effect on total spending, tend
ing neither to increase it nor to decrease it, their influence
may be ignored in our analysis. Therefore subject to the excep
tion noted, every individual, business enterprise, or Govern
ment must fit into one of these two classes. Either the economic
unit spends less than its income and is a surplus unit, or it
spends more and is a deficit unit. And income is, of course, the
point of reference since, obviously, the concept of a surplus
or deficit has no meaning except as it relates to an income of
a given size during a given accounting period.
At this point the consequences of a corollary fact must be
noted. Just as the income of a particular economic unit depends
on the spending of other units, so the spending of each unit
creates income for others. The related role of surplus and
deficit units now becomes apparent. Surplus units receive or
take out from the income stream more than they put back.
Deficit units put into the income stream more than they take
out. Thus we note a fundamental accounting identity: In a
national income of a given size total deficits are necessarily
exactly equal to total surpluses. The key importance of this
identity is that it enables us to grasp the following fact: If the
deficit units by their spending return to the income stream
less than the surplus units take out of the stream, the total
level of spending and income must fall. It is this fact which
explains the necessity for deficits.
Now let us state these formal accounting relationships in
more familiar language. The surpluses are more commonly
known as savings and the deficits as investment spending.
Money saved represents a withdrawal from the income stream.
The impact of such savings, or “non-spending,” taken by itself
is deflationary. The effect is to reduce sales and the demand
for goods. Other things being equal, it is clear that these sav
ings must cause the spending stream to drop unless there is
some way to put them back.
The way in which the surplus funds of the savers usually
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get back into the spending-income stream is for the deficit units
to borrow the savings and spend them for the production of
real investment assets—new plants, new machines, larger
inventory, and other actual additions to the nation’s wealth.
The necessity for continuous deficits and ever growing debt
now becames clear. If the savings of the surplus units who
spend less than they receive are not borrowed and spent for
investment by deficit units who spend more than they receive,
the funds withheld are lost from the income stream. If this
happens total spending, income, and output must fall by an
amount exactly equal to the excess of the total surpluses over
the total deficits. Since savers do not usually spend their own
savings to produce capital goods but instead lend them to busi
ness enterprises which spend the funds for construction of such
new equipment, the process necessarily involves borrowing and
lending, usually with the aid of a wide variety of financial
intermediary institutions such as commercial and investment
banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance companies.
The essential point is that except for savers who do their own
investment spending, every new act of saving and lending,
which results in spending for economic growth necessarily
involves an addition to total debt.
A note of explanation regarding terminology is necessary
here. By investment we do not mean what the average person
thinks of as investment. Investment here means actual spend
ing for the construction of a capital asset, or the acquisition of
new inventory which also adds to wealth. By savings we mean
funds withheld from spending for consumption and made
available for production of new capital. What most people call
their “investments” are really savings in the economic sense.
When a saver purchases a security, a savings and loan share,
or an insurance policy, or deposits his money in a bank this does
not necessarily mean that these savings will actually be spent
to produce new investment goods.
In fact, this is the heart of the problem. Savings decisions
and investment decisions in the economic sense are not made
by the same people. Every person with income must decide
whether or not to save and, if so, how much. But decisions to
invest are made only by the relatively few people responsible
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for the management of American free enterprise. If a saver
buys a secondhand security the money will not be returned to
the income stream and nothing will be added to the nation s
wealth if the seller uses the proceeds to increase his liquidity.
No investment takes place in the economic sense unless the
security has been newly issued by an enterprise which spends
the money to produce actual new capital goods. In the same
way funds “invested” in a savings deposit result in no real
investment if the bank simply allows its reserve ratio to
increase. Deflationary, sales-destroying surpluses of savers
are redeemed for the income stream only when enterprises
acting as deficit units borrow these funds and spend them
for construction of real additions to our wealth. This conclusion
is probably consistent with the intuitive feeling of most read
ers that the nation’s real wealth cannot be increased merely
by passing financial instruments from hand to hand.
The only exception to the necessity for borrowing relates
to the savings of individuals and businesses who themselves
spend for investment assets. If a man saves enough money
during the year to add a room to his house he has both saved
and invested. There is no effect on total spending or income.
The substantial retained earnings which American corpora
tions invest in new plant and equipment constitute a more
important example. In such cases the problem considered here
does not arise. The saver himself spends for investment. How
ever, most savings get back into the income stream only when
deficit units through financial intermediaries borrow and
spend them.
The mystery of a healthy economy in spite of skyrocketing
debt need no longer puzzle us. Growing debt is clearly essential
to continued health. A nation cannot get richer without saving,
any more than an individual can. We cannot grow if all of our
output is consumed each year. Savers, by abstaining from
spending a part of their incomes, in effect release some of the
nation’s resources from the production of consumer goods. The
resources so released are thereby made available to enterprises
for producing capital goods which add to the nation’s wealth.
But if enterprises as deficit units do not borrow the unspent
funds and hence do not use them to produce investment goods,
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efforts to save become abortive. The resources released from
production of consumer goods are simply unemployed. There
can be no real savings without corresponding investment, that
is, deficit spending. A nation’s real savings, the real increases

in its wealth during a given year, cannot be more than that
part of its total output which it did not consume. In other words,
the investment goods which it produces above and beyond
the things consumed are a measure both of its savings and of
its investment. Efforts to save more than enterprises are wil
ling to borrow and invest simply result in reduced income, out
put, employment, and profits. Hence the amount of saving a
nation can do without impoverishing itself is limited by the
total amount of deficits which it finds desirable and profitable
to incur. “Thus, Thrift may be the handmaid and nurse of
Enterprise. But equally she may not. And, perhaps, even
usually she is not. For enterprise is connected with thrift not
directly but at one remove; and the link which should join
them is frequently missing. For the engine which drives Enter
prise is not Thrift, but Profit.”3 We conclude that if continued
deficits and growing debt are “unnecessary” this is true only in
the sense that unemployment, unsold goods, business losses,
and decreasing rates of growth offer an alternative.

A Deficit Spending Model
A simple arithmetical model of an imaginary nation’s eco
nomic system will help make the above points clear. Let us
first consider the operations of a system where there is no
Government activity at all, just as in the discussion above we
made no distinction between Government and other spending
activity. Having examined the basic properties of a private
enterprise system without Government we can add Govern
ment activity later and note whatever changes it may intro
duce.
Money can be spent in only two ways, for consumption, C,
and for investment, I, so that C plus I equals total spending
Keynes, John Maynard, A Treatise on Money, Vol. II, Harcourt, Brace
and Company, New York. 1930. ». 14fl.
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which of course equals total income, Y, and in turn measures
gross national product, GNP. Hence,
C + I = Y = GNP
This can be read, “gross national expenditure equals gross
national income equals gross national product.” The reader
will recognize that except for the absence of Government
expenditure this is in the format of Table 2 taken from the
Federal Reserve Bulletin. The nation’s income is generated
by the two kinds of spending; but, once received, its disposition
is a different matter. Since there are no taxes, the people can
dispose of their income, Y, in only two ways. Either it is spent
for consumption, C, or it is saved, S, so that ,
Y — C = S, or Y = C + S
Note that decisions to save or consume are made by everyone
who has income to dispose of while the decisions to spend for
investment goods, I, are made only by a relatively small group
of people. They are the owners and managers of business
enterprises and the amount of the investment spending they
plan to do will depend on their estimates of the prospects for
realizing a profit from such investment spending.
Since these two groups do not include all of the same people
it would be the merest accident if total plans to save were
equal to total plans to invest. Yet we have noted that real sav
ings cannot be different from real investment. They are in fact
two words for the same thing. Also it is clear from our income
creation equation,
C+ I = Y
and from our income disposal equation,
C+ S = Y
that S and I must be equal to each other. But they are equal only
in the ex post, or realized sense. In an ex ante or planned sense,
as noted above, plans to save may differ from plans to invest.
At this point we may recall the accounting identity which
states that with an income of a given size total surpluses are
necessarily exactly equal to total deficits. Income has no voli-

1

DEFICIT SPENDING

71

tion or life of its own. It is the result of spending decisions by
human beings exercising volition. Income is the resultant.
This is in the ex post sense. To explain income and output we
have to account for the spending decisions which cause them
to be what they are. This will become apparent as we examine
the operations of Model I below. The nation begins each income
period, a week, a month, or a year, with a certain income which
has been generated by the two types of spending. The people
can then dispose of that income either by spending it for con
sumption or by withholding it as savings. Planned or expected
magnitudes are on the left side of our model. Actual or realized
magnitudes and resulting debt are shown on the right. On the
left, or plans, side we find the people’s plans to dispose of a
given income, the relevant relationship being summarized by
the column headings, Y — C = S. Plans to invest are shown
under the column headed I. Of the four planned or expected
magnitudes only C and I are solid, for they involve spending
decisions which the individuals have power to make. Nobody
can really say for certain and in advance what his income or
savings will be in the end. But he can decide to spend. Under
the actual or realized magnitudes the key relationships are
again summarized by the column headings C + I = Y. In other
words income depends on spending and nothing else. If it
makes the analysis clearer the reader may, if he wishes,
assume that planned income at the beginning of each period is
the income actually earned during the previous period and
available for disposal in the current period. This is perhaps
the most simple possible assumption and is also realistic since
the income available for disposition in a given period usually
depends on what was earned in a previous period. However,
there is no reason why greater or lesser income could not be
expected, with spending plans modified accordingly. The ar
rows connecting the two Y’s are meant to show that we make
here the simplifying assumption that people plan to spend or
save in the current period what was received or earned in the
last. The periods assumed here are “years” though obviously
they could as well be “weeks” or “months.” In order to simplify
the analysis we assume that there is no growth in population
and no advance in technology.
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MODEL I
(billions of dollars)
Planned or
Expected Amounts

Year

Y —

1

500

2

500

3
2
3a

C =

Realized or Actual Amounts

S

I

C +

I =

400

100

100

400

100

500

400

100

100

400

100

500

400

100

80

400

500

400

100

100

400

100 +100

100

500

II

100 +100

200

80

480

80 + 80

280

100

500

100 +100

200

_________________________
4I

4.

500

Change Total
S in debt debt

Y

I

__________|

400

400

-120

400

120

520

120 +120 320

During the first two periods, everything runs smoothly since
it is assumed that planned surpluses do not exceed planned
deficits. Each year the $100 billion of savings are borrowed
by the investors and returned to the income stream. Because
income holds up, planned money savings of $100 billion result
in real savings for the country, as actual capital goods are pro
duced in the amount of $100 billion. Since this is the amount
saved and lent, debt rises by $100 billion each year as a neces
sary result.
In year 3, things go wrong. Plans to consume and save are
unchanged but, for whatever reason, estimates of profit oppor
tunities deteriorate and investors plan to spend only $80 billion.
Since only spending counts, income must drop too. But actual
real savings cannot be more than $80 billion if only $80 billion
is spent for construction of new capital goods. Additions to real
wealth cannot exceed the difference between total production
and consumption. How can this be so if the savers actually
saved $100 billion and can show securities, deposit slips, and
similar instruments to prove it? The answer is that a part of
these savings, $20 billion to be exact, were offset by losses,
mainly negative profits, of those who suffered declining in
come. We are concerned with the total savings of the nation,
and in computing the net change we must take into account the
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losses as well as the gains. Income has fallen to $480 billion and
these losses have made the sum of total surpluses exactly equal
to the sum of total deficits as it must be. Total demand has fal
len by $20 billion compared with year 2, productive resources
capable of producing $20 billion in output are wasted in unem
ployment and, of course, the foregone output is lost forever.
Let us now consider what would happen if the managers of
business enterprises see such favorable prospects for profit
that in year 3 they plan to invest $120 billion, while consum
ers still plan to spend $400 billion and save only $100 billion.
In order to show the effects of such a development all of the
magnitudes for year 2 are duplicated in the table, the only dif
ference being in our alternate assumptions for year 3 which
is designated 3a. The results are just the opposite of those which
followed when plans to invest fell short of planned savings.
Since actual spending is now increased by $20 billion, total
demand, in other words total spending, has risen to $520 billion.
Debt has of course increased by $120 billion instead of $100
billion. If population growth and advancement of technology
have provided corresponding additional productive resources,
the increased spending results in real increases in output. On
the other hand, if corresponding productive resources are not
forthcoming, increased spending cannot cause increased out
put. It only raises the price tag. We get not more goods but
only more expensive goods. We call it inflation. In either case
the increased investment spending causes savings to be in
creased correspondingly as money incomes increase beyond
expectations. These are real savings if increased output has
been possible. If not their real value has been dissipated by
higher prices.
The workings of the model have now clarified its essential
properties as they relate to spending, deficits, and debt. To
maintain an income of a given size, total deficits in each year
must be exactly equal to total surpluses for that year and, of
course, each year’s deficit adds an equal amount to debt. Defi
cits equal to surpluses will only maintain a given level of
income from year to year. Income will not fall but it will not
rise either. This would be a static world. In the real world
where growing population and advances in technology make
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possible ever-growing output, total spending must increase
from year to year. To provide higher levels of spending,
planned deficits must grow in size each year and must be
greater than planned surpluses. The ever larger deficits in
excess of planned savings are financed by the banking system
which creates new money for the purpose. However, mere
willingness of the banking system to lend does not assure that
adequate additional money will be borrowed and spent. Deficit
spenders must see advantage in such borrowing and this means
that they must have reasonable expectations of profit. The
appropriate rate of increase in money supply and in the level
of spending depends upon how rapidly corresponding increases
in real output are possible. If money supply and spending grow
more rapidly than the rate at which new productive resources
become available we have inflation. On the other hand, if they
grow more slowly than population and other resources we have
rising rates of unemployment and economic stagnation. Thus
we see that spending, deficits, and debt in a free market society
may grow either too rapidly or too slowly, but grow they must.
It was only for the purpose of clarifying the role of deficits
and surpluses in our model that we made the assumption of
fixed population and static technology.

The Role of Government Deficits
We have seen that a free enterprise market economy cannot
operate and grow without deficits and expanding debt. It has
also become clear that since the rate of growth of deficits and
debt is determined by the independent decisions of millions
of free individuals subject to no central planning or control,
deficits may grow either too slowly, in which case we have
recession, or too rapidly, in which case we have inflation. This
is simply a description of the manner in which our economy
operates. It is based on accounting identities and involves no
value judgments or moral principles. For good or ill, it is the
way things are. We have seen that this is so even in the
absence of any Government at all. In contrast to Model I
where no Government existed let us now introduce Government operations into the picture.
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First we must note the relationship between Government
deficits and surpluses and those of the private economy. Let
Government spending be represented by G and taxes by T.
Then as we saw in Table 2 which presented national income
data for 1962 the spending-income equation for the real world
includes Government spending and must be written,
C+I+G=Y
In the real world we also note that since people must pay
taxes they cannot devote all of their income either to con
sumption or savings. They can spend for consumption only
what is left after paying taxes. Planned savings will be the
remainder. The real world income disposal equation can there
fore be written
Y — T — C = S, or C + S + T = Y
Now if
C+ I + G= Y
and if
C + S -f T = Y
it follows that, being equal to the same thing, they are neces
sarily equal to each other .We can then write
C+I+G=C+S+T
Removing the C’s by cancellation we get
I+G=S+T

Changing the sign of our T and bringing it over with the G in
order to place Government spending and taxes together we get
I + (G - T) = S.
This is our fundamental deficit-surplus equation for the whole
economy where Government deficits and surpluses are taken
into account along with those of the private sector. Like our
original deficit-surplus equation, I = S, it is purely descriptive.
It is also an accounting identity involving no value judgments
or questions of right and wrong, desirable or undesirable. If
Government spending exceeds taxes we have a Government
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deficit. In this case (G — T) is positive and is added to I, the
private deficit, thereby increasing the total flow of spending.
Together the two represent the total deficit which must equal
S, the total surplus. On the other hand, if tax receipts exceed
Government spending we have a budgetary surplus. In the
equation this surplus, which actually represents Government
savings, will have a negative sign and will be subtracted from
I, the private deficits. Such a surplus is, of course, an offset to
private deficit spending and like any savings tends to be defla
tionary. Thus in a period when private deficits grow too rap
idly and tend to create inflationary pressures, a Government
surplus, by withholding from the income stream more than
it puts back, can be used to exercise a dampening effect on
total demand and is anti-inflationary.
Let us now organize our model in a more realistic format
in which Government taxing and spending operations are in
cluded. As in Model I, the column headings indicate relevant re
lationships. It is again assumed that spending plans are related
to income earned in the previous period. An important differ
ence in regard to plans is that planned consumption will bear an
inverse relationship to taxes. The. lower the taxes, the more
consumers are able to spend. Since plans to invest depend on
prospects for profit, which in turn have some relationship to
consumer spending, it is likely that plans to invest will also
be stimulated by tax reductions and repressed by tax increases.
However, in order to clarify the workings of our model, let
us first make the simplifying assumption that only consumption
plans are affected by tax changes. We shall also assume the
most favorable possible situation from the Government’s view
point, namely, that all of any new consumer income made
available by a tax cut will be spent on consumption, and that
none of it will be added to savings (although there is clearly
the possibility, or even likelihood, that some may be saved).
It is also likely that investment plans may be directly stimu
lated by tax cuts, but we leave this possibility aside for the
moment. For the sake of simplicity we again assume static
population and technology.
Everything here operates in much the same way as in the
more simple model where Government was absent. In the first
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model, the people used their money to buy the output of priv
ate enterprises and received in exchange finished consumer
goods or titles to capital goods. Unless they could buy such
things from private firms, there were no roads, no schools, no
courts, no police, no fire departments, no sanitary facilities,
no mail service, no military establishment, nor any other pub
lic services. In our real world model the people are able to buy
such services from the Government. In addition to the goods
and services purchased from the private sector of the economy
by paying cash or credit, the people now buy these other
things from the public sector by paying taxes. The main differ
ence is that whereas the things people buy at the “private
store” are determined by daily voting (in the form of dollars);
what they buy at the “public store” is determined by less fre
quent voting, But, of course, in either case the effect is the
same. The people themselves determine how much they wish
to obtain from private enterprise in exchange for cash or
credit and how much from Government in exchange for taxes.
But, now let us note an important difference in the two
models. In Model I total deficits and surpluses resulted from
the independent decisions of millions of free individuals. If
plans to invest were inadequate to absorb planned savings the
result was that spending, income, and output inevitably fell,
causing unemployment and recession. When planned deficits
grew more rapidly than planned surpluses, spending increased
and, if productive resources were not forthcoming at cor
responding rates, inflation was the result. In the real world,
since Government is also able to run deficits or surpluses, its
fiscal operations afford a possible cushion against the unde
sirable effects of excessive private deficits or surpluses.
Turning now to developments in Model II we assume that,
as in Model I, everything goes smoothly during the first two
years. Planned private deficits equal to planned private sur
pluses maintain the level of spending and income. Since the
Government budget is balanced at $100 billion there is no Gov
ernment deficit or surplus and this, of course, is as it should be
if the stability of the economy is not to be disturbed. A bal
anced budget in this situation is necessary. Government debt
is zero and remains zero. Total debt, still made up entirely of
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private debt, increases by $100 billion each year, the rate neces
sary to absorb private surpluses. But again in the third year
things are assumed to go wrong. Private deficit spending of
$80 billion is insufficient to absorb planned private surpluses
of $100 billion and, since the Government continues to maintain
a balanced budget, there is no public deficit to absorb the
excess surpluses. Therefore total spending, income, output,
and the rate of growth of debt all fall by $20 billion, the amount
by which planned surpluses exceed planned deficits.
Now consider the lower section of Model II where we again
reproduce years 2 and 3 but with a different fiscal policy.
Private deficit spending has declined but in this case the Gov
ernment does not maintain a balanced budget. In order to
offset a decline of $20 billion in private deficits it cuts taxes by
$20 billion, thereby incurring a public deficit of $20 billion.
Thus total deficits, including Government deficit, are equal
to total planned surpluses and the spending-income stream is
maintained. Though private debt fails to grow at the requi
site rate of $100 billion per year increasing public debt fills the
gap and maintains the rate of total spending and total demand
undiminished.
According to the assumptions made earlier, all of the in
creased disposable income made available by the tax cut is
used to increase consumption spending. In the real world, as
noted earlier, some of the increase in disposable income would
certainly be used to pay debts or to increase savings. To the
extent that this occurs, an even greater tax cut and a larger
government deficit would be necessary in order to maintain
the original level of spending. Although cutting taxes might
at first seem to be a more conservative way to create a deficit
than by increased government spending, the fact is that a
given change in the level of income can be achieved by a
smaller deficit if it is accomplished through a change in spend
ing. A billion dollar increase in Government spending adds a
billion dollars directly to the income stream, but part of a bil
lion dollar tax cut will be saved or used to pay debts.
The assumption that all income freed by the tax cut went
into additional consumption was made only to simplify the
arithmetic. In all probability some would go into increased

80

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

investment spending. In the real world, the actual distribution
between additional consumption and additional investment
would depend on a wide variety of factors such as the distribu
tion of the tax cut benefits, consumer optimism or pessimism,
business estimates of profit prospects, and probably even the
public attitude toward Government deficit spending and pub
lic debt.
The role of Government deficits can now be summarized
in the same mechanical accounting terminology employed in
describing deficits in general. Provided that planned private
deficits are inadequate to absorb planned private surpluses,
the alternative to a Government deficit sufficient to absorb
the difference is declining income, output, and employment.
This proposition is a purely descriptive statement of fact in
which no matter of opinion or value judgment is involved.
The point is that there must be total deficits of a given size
somewhere in the economy if total spending and total demand
are to be maintained. Hence, if sufficient deficits cannot be
coaxed from the private sector, either these deficits must
appear in the public sector or spending, income, and output
inevitably will decline. Business sales will fall, profits will
disappear and goods will remain unsold. In this situation the
public must understand that either Government deficit spend
ing or unemployment and recession are inescapable alterna
tives. The only value judgment involved is in the determina
tion of which is to be preferred. But, since it is a value judg
ment, the economist as economist cannot decide for the people
which is the better choice. His only function is to let people
know where each of the two paths leads.

Government Deficits: Plan or No Plan
Up to this point the term “planned Government deficit” has
been used in a context which implied a deliberate and con
scious adjustment of the Federal budget to offset excessive or
inadequate private deficits. The idea was that since planned
private deficits and surpluses are the product of decentralized
decision-making it would be mainly accidental if they hap
pened to occur regularly in just the “right” amounts to main-
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tain full employment without inflation. Hence approximately
right ’ total amounts could be assured by central planning
of Government deficits or surpluses which would provide the
necessary increases or decreases in the spending stream. As
an interpretation of actual Government policy in modern
United States, such a concept would be naive indeed. Such has
not been the case. It is true that President Roosevelt experi
mented with small planned deficits during parts of his first
two terms. But he was not firmly convinced of the wisdom of
such policies, and as a result refused to use most of the great
powers given him by the Thomas Rider to the Farm Bill in
1933. During his eight years in office prior to 1941, most of his
budget deficits were not markedly larger than the last deficit
of $2.7 billion incurred by President Hoover; two were smaller,
$2.6 and $1.2 billion, and two were about the same size. The
largest was $4.4 billion in 1936.4 In the face of the threat posed
by a business recession, President Eisenhower in 1954 recog
nized the basic concepts in a remarkable statement:
The fourth principle is to act promptly and vigorously if economic conditions require it. The Government w ill not hesitate
to make greater use of monetary, debt management, and credit
policy, including liberalized use of Federal insurance of private
obligations, or to modify the tax structure, or to reduce taxes,
or to expand on a large scale useful public works, or to take any
other steps that may be necessary. The Government must and
w ill be ready to deal with any contingencies that may arise. An
essential part of this preparedness under present circumstances
is a higher Federal debt lim it which is already necessary for the
efficient conduct of the Government’s current operations.5

Frequent public pronouncements since that time, however,
suggest that the above did not represent President Eisenhow
er s personal views. The recent publications and statements
of President Kennedy’s advisors probably represent the first
clear espousal and recommendation of a planned Federal defi
cit with full Presidential approval. The reader may protest
that a great many Federal deficits during recessions of the
postwar period were received by Administrations in WashingEconomic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress January
I • : 1963, p. 238.
Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress January
28,1954, p.113.
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ton with acquiescence and even approval. It was true that
President Eisenhower’s recession deficits amounted to $9.5 bil
lion in 1953 and $12.5 billion in 1959. But this does not mean
that the Administration “planned” these deficits. We can only
say that they did not plan not to have them. In other words,
when recession brought declining revenues, there was no effort
to prevent this from causing a deficit. The important point
here is that during a recession, unless extremely vigorous
remedial steps are taken, a Government deficit occurs auto
matically. As national spending and income fall, Government
CHART I
FEDERAL BUDGET AND BUSINESS CAPITAL ACCOUNT:
SURPLUSES OR DEFICITS, 1947-1962
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Source: Economic Report of the President, January 1963, Chart 9, p. 76.
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tax revenues decline, while Government outlays for unemploy
ment benefits, farm price supports, loans, welfare, and other
assistance increase. A Government deficit is the passive result.
We do not have to plan a deficit because it occurs anyway.
But affirmative action and planning would be necessary at
such times if we decided that the budget should be balanced.
To achieve a balanced budget we would have to raise tax rates
or impose new taxes on the one hand and cut Government
spending on the other. This would balance the budget but it
would, of course, also cause further declines in spending, in
come, and output. And, as usual in such cases, business profits
would be the first casualty.
An automatic inverse relationship between the Federal
budget and business capital account is shown in Chart 1. Move
ments of the business capital account toward deficit or surplus
shown by the solid line reflect differences between retained
earnings and gross private domestic investment, while similiar
movements of the Federal budget on national income account
are shown by the dotted line. It should be clearly understood
that a “deficit” on business capital account does not mean that
business is unprofitable. On the contrary it implies favorable
expectations. The term is used here in the sense of investment
spending for new capital goods in excess of business’s own
savings. Obviously the stimulus for such deficit spending is
a favorable prospect for profit.
As explained in the recent Economic Report of the President,
The chart shows clearly that movements in the deficits and
surpluses of these two sectors bear a marked inverse relation
ship. . . . The budget of the business sector exhibits surpluses
or small deficits in years of recession and slack, moves toward
deficit as the economy expands, and commonly achieves a sub
stantial deficit in years of prosperity and low unemployment
• ■■The Federal budget shows a reverse pattern. It consistently
moves toward a surplus as the economy expands and toward a
deficit as it contracts. These movements are mainly a passive
result of the operation of the automatic fiscal stabilizers . .
In conclusion we find that we really have three choices of
Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress January
1963, pp. 76-77.
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fiscal policy. First, we could plan and vigorously execute a
balanced budget. Second, we could plan and execute the
“right” amount of deficits or surplus necessary to avoid infla
tion on the one hand and recession on the other. Third, we
could allow budgets to run surpluses and deficits more or less
passively as a result of movements in the business cycle. The
first choice would involve no increases or decreases in Govern
ment debt but would tend to intensify the ups and downs of
the spending-income stream, the pattern of “boom and bust.”
The second policy would from time to time involve possibly
large increases in Government debt, and at times decreases as
well. It would also have maximum smoothing effects on the
business cycle and promote economic growth. The third policy,
which is a compromise, would involve less changes in Govern
ment debt than under policy two, but would also have a more
limited stabilizing effect. It is the third policy which the
United States has followed in the postwar period.

What About the Debt?
The result of deficit spending whether public or private is,
of course, increased debt. Though the Practical Man may con
cede that he himself has done pretty well since the war in
spite of Government deficits, he is uneasy about the Govern
ment debt. While the precise nature of the disasters which
threaten has not been clearly explained, it is possible to identify
and list a number of specific misfortunes, disadvantages, or
problems which such a debt is regarded as likely to entail. Let
us consider seven of the comments or questions which are
frequently heard.
1. The Government debt is a growing burden. As noted
earlier the concept of a Government debt skyrocketing out of
control is pure folklore. The facts simply do not support it.
The amounts of public and private debt in 1946 and 1962 to
gether with percentage increases appear in Table 1. For com
parison the table also includes debt figures for a familiar pri
vate enterprise, American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
and for a familiar industry, commercial banking.
Table 1 shows that since the war Federal net debt has in-
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creased hardly at all by comparison with private debt. More
over we should recognize that the burden of a debt of a given
size means little except in comparison with the income of the
debtor. The first column showing gross national product for
the two years enables us to view the growth of debt against
debt bearing capacity. In the third column we note that net
Federal debt which represented 109 percent of gross national
product in 1946 had fallen to 46 percent by 1962. Chart 2 shows
the movement of net Federal debt as a percent of gross na
tional product from 1939 to the present time.
CHART n
FEDERAL DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC AS A PERCENT OF
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From Chart 2 it is apparent that our Federal debt did indeed
skyrocket during World War II, but that since that time it has
come to represent a smaller and smaller proportion of GNP
as income has grown more rapidly than the debt. We see that
e debt now bears about the same relation to national income
as it did before the war.
2. Our children will inherit a burden of Government debt.
1e
sun which Galileo’s churchmen saw rising in the East
it seems pretty clear on this point that we see what we see.
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A man does not have to be an economist to know that within
twenty years or so a child born today will have to pay taxes
to cover the interest on a Government debt incurred by his
parents and grandparents. The facts are clear but how should
we interpret them?
Our Government debt, like our much larger private debt,
is for the most part internally held. It is owed to Americans
and not to foreigners. Moreover our national balance sheet like
all balance sheets has two sides, assets as well as liabilities.
We could argue that Americans are the poorest people in the
world because they owe the biggest Government debt. (They
do!) Or we could argue that they are the richest people in the
world because they own the major portion of the world’s
soundest financial asset, the United States Government bond.
The latter statement taken by itself can hardly be regarded as
a logically valid argument for issuing more Government bonds.
But neither is the former a valid argument against Govern
ment debt. Either position taken alone makes nonsense because
each taken alone ignores the other side of the balance sheet.
We need both sides. Americans are suffering from a nervous
anxiety which for want of any other term we might call “bal
ance sheet ambivalence.” The fact is that our children will owe
the debt to themselves and in this sense it will make them
neither richer nor poorer.
But what about the interest on the debt? Will it not be a
burden on future as well as present taxpayers? How can the
next generation feel that they are getting any real benefit
from the income on their Government bonds when it is they
who must provide the tax money to pay the interest? Again
the facts are undeniable. But consider an exact analogy. The
same generation of children who inherit the Government bonds
will also receive a vastly greater heritage of securities of
private business corporations. The revenues from which those
corporations will pay interest and dividends can come omy
from sales to the generation of Americans living at that time.
Will that generation then feel that the income from their busi
ness securities is also a spurious gain because it is they who
must provide the funds necessary to pay it? By precisely iden
tical logic the owner of General Motors securities should avoid
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purchase of a Chevrolet lest he find himself paying his own
investment income.
This is not to say that there is no possible way in which pub
licly owned Government debt may represent a burden. Since
ownership of bonds is not likely to be distributed among the
people in exactly the same pattern as tax collections it is some
times pointed out that the income on Government securities in
volves a redistribution of income. But it should be recognized
that ownership of private securities causes exactly the same
kind of redistribution, though on a much larger scale owing to
the far greater volume of such securities. This follows from
the fact that most of the income from corporate securities is
paid to a very small proportion of the total population who as
customers of American business provide all of its revenues.
3. The Government debt causes inflation. Inflation means a
rising price level and this has usually been caused by increases
in the spending-income stream at a more rapid rate than the
rate at which additional goods could be made available. In the
economist’s terminology demand exceeds supply. With money
demand increasing faster than businesses are able to increase
the real supply of goods, price tags are marked up. A bit of
reflection on the role of debt in our national income models
makes clear that there is no direct connection between the
size of the debt and the level or volume of spending. It is the
rate of increase in the size of debt that counts, since it is only
new deficits and debt which add to the spending stream. With
exceptions to be noted in a moment, once debt has been created,
it has no direct bearing whatever on the volume of spending.
Its main effect on spending flows not from its existence but
rather from the process by which it is created. This is amply
clear in both models. It should also be clear that in this respect
Government debt is no different from private debt. So long as
they are financed in the same way each adds equally to the
spending stream. Since World War II by far the greatest addi
tions to our money supply have come from bank loans to pri
vate borrowers.
However, we must note certain ways in which existence of
Government debt may be inflationary. In the first place own
ership of large amounts of Government bonds, like ownership
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of any other assets, tends to make people feel richer and may
cause them to spend more out of current incomes than they
would in the absence of such assets. But Government bonds
are no different from other financial assets in this respect and
of course, represent a relatively smaller amount.
Government bonds also may have inflationary effects if
people turn them in to the Treasury for cash. Since such action
by the holders of $48 billion in non-marketable U.S. Savings
bonds would involve losses to the holders, a mass movement of
this kind might be expected only if people anticipate severe
inflation which would cause even greater losses in the real
value of the bonds. But this did not occur on a large scale
even in the late 1940’s — a period when inflation was at its
worst.
Sale of marketable Government bonds held by the public
would provide new money to add to the spending stream only
if the bonds were bought by banks. Otherwise though the
seller of the bond has more money, the buyer has less. But
banks are under strict control in this respect. Like any other
business they acquire assets by incurring debts. We call their
debts our deposits (our “money”). Banks can go on acquiring
all the earning assets which they desire simply by issuing de
posit slips to the sellers, subject only to the restriction that a
certain minimum proportion of their assets must be in the
form of currency in their vaults or deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks. These are the banks’ reserves and are expressed as a
percentage of their deposit liabilities rather than of their
assets. But since Federal Reserve Banks are also able to in
crease and decrease their deposit liabilities (the reserves of
the banks) by the same process of buying and selling assets,
they have complete control over the reserves of the banking
system and hence over the banks’ power to create new deposits.
Member bank reserves, which are subject to 24 hour surveil
lance by the Federal Reserve System, are the most carefully
and continuously managed magnitude in our American finan
cial system and, in this case, the power of control is absolute,
though not without restraints.
Incidentally, this manner of describing the operations of
banks in terms of their balance sheets serves to impress upon us
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the complete pervasiveness of the debt structure which under
lies our entire financial system, even what we call our “mon
ey. In our daily life we tend to think of “money” as something
final and ultimate, underlying all. If we owe a debt what we
owe is “money.” Money seems to be the foundation of debt.
Actually, the exact opposite is the case. Money rests almost
wholly on debt and this was just as true in Grandpa’s day as
it is now. As with Government debt we get the true picture
only if we look at both sides of the balance sheets. We all have
our basic money assets “deposited” in banks and against these
deposits the banks keep assets. But banks’ “assets” are the
debts of others! To be sure, a fraction of bank assets are in the
form of deposits at Federal Reserve Banks. But these bank
assets are in turn debts of the Federal Reserve Banks, whose
assets in turn are mainly debts of the Federal Government.
When we ask for “cash” we get mainly Federal Reserve notes
which are debts of the Reserve Banks based as before on their
“assets” in the form of Government debt. Relatively speaking,
the actual amount of gold underlying all this fantastic pyramid
is minuscule. However, for those who view all this simply as
confirmation of their fear that the country is going to the
dogs, it may be pointed out that our money still has vastly
more gold “backing” than Grandpa’s money ever had.
Failure to understand the debt origins of money sometimes
leads to absurdly inconsistent attitudes. For example, at the
end of World War II the American people were greatly pleased
with their fat, new bank accounts, businessmen rejoiced in the
resulting steady stream of eager, well-heeled customers, and
newspapers from time to time proudly announced that bank
deposits in their communities had reached new record highs.
Yet the editorial pages of these same newspapers counseled
sober reflection on the alarming increase in Government debt.
The fact is that virtually all of the delightful new deposits
were created when the banks gave deposit slips to the United
States Treasury in exchange for Government bonds. Banks
were able to increase their deposit indebtedness in this way be
cause the Federal Reserve System had provided them with the
necessary reserves by increasing its deposit debts to them
(their reserves). Once the necessary bank reserves had been
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provided, the banks and the Treasury simply traded debts.
Each gave its own debt in exchange for the debt of the other.
The Treasury received deposit debts of banks with which it
could pay for the war and the banks received interest bearing
Government debt. When the Treasury wrote checks to buy
war materials ownership of the new deposits was transferred
to the people. The banks then owed the deposit debts to the
people instead of to the Treasury. Though the people were
happy about these newly acquired bank deposits—their new
“money”—they were extremely critical of the consequent in
crease in Government debt. They did not realize that in con
demning the Government debt they were condemning the
source of the blessing! It was another case of balance sheet
ambivalence.
As another possible source of inflation it is also conceivable
that in the course of the continuous weekly refunding of short
term Government debt, buyers might refuse to repurchase
bonds and instead demand cash, simply by allowing their
bonds to run off at maturity. In such a case the Treasury would
have no alternative but to sell the new bonds to banks to whom
the Federal Reserve would be obliged to furnish the necessary
reserves as it did in World War II. While this eventuality is
technically possible reflection reveals that when we speak of
buyers refusing to repurchase bonds what we are really talking
about is higgling over price (yield). Since there is no question
of the solvency of the borrower (he can print his own money!),
the only question relates to the interest rate. If the Treasury
has trouble selling bonds to non-bank buyers at a given rate
of interest, it could presumably find such buyers at some
higher rate. In other words, higher interest rates are a weapon
available for use against inflation and may have to be used
from time to time.
The fundamental relationship of inflation to debt creation
is implicit in our models and it boils down to this: If additional
deficits (and debt) are incurred only when total spending is
inadequate by definition (i.e., some previously agreed upon
level of unemployment) we can never get too much spending
by incurring deficits. In other words, when the need for stimu
lation is eliminated, the stimulation is eliminated.
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4. When will this huge Government debt ever be repaid?
Here is another situation where we see what we seem to see
only if we insist on applying to nations or institutions rules
appropriate for an individual or a household. And, of course,
the same rules do not apply. While it is true that every per
son must some day pay all of his debts, and every debt instru
ment must be settled on its maturity date, a bit of observation
makes clear that these rules afford little insight into man
agement of the total debt of non-mortal institutions, whether
public or private. Every individual some day dies and his cred
itors expect settlement by that date. For him the trumpet
sounds and accounts must be settled. But what about AT&T?
What about the banks of our country? What about the private
debt? From Table 1 we see that like those of Government,
private debts have also grown. When will they be paid off?
To be sure, the individual creditor of AT&T gets his money
whenever a particular instrument matures, and any individual
depositor can have his money from the banks on demand. But
this is also true of Government debt. The Federal Government
refunds maturing debt each week, and every month pays off
in this way literally billions of dollars in individual claims,
just as the banks do. Moreover, as far as any individual owner
is concerned a Government bond is the nearest thing in the
world to cash. He can always sell it to another individual.
Thus we see that in these respects Government debt is not
materially different from private debts. Business debts and
bank deposits have been growing as long as our country has
grown. Expanding debts are a sign of economic health. If a
man could return a hundred years from now it is a pretty safe
bet that he would find AT&T, the banks, Government, and
business in general with debts that would make present levels
look small indeed unless, of course, our country stops growing.
And so if we ask, “When will the directors of AT&T become
uneasy and at last decide to pay off their ‘bloating debt’?” “On
what cataclysmic day will the banks pay off their depositors?”
“When will this huge Government debt ever be repaid?”, the
answer is unmistakable and clear: “When Gabriel blows his
horn.”
5. We face national bankruptcy. Although this statement is
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frequently heard, the meaning as applied to Government is
not clear. Since “bankruptcy” refers to a legal process which
can have no meaning where Government is concerned, those
who use the term must have in mind “insolvency.” Webster
defines “insolvent” as “unable to pay one’s debts.” But on
reflection it becomes clear that this situation is quite inconceiv
able for a debtor which can print its own money at will. Gov
ernment does this whenever it borrows from the banks. In what
sense, then, could a Government possibly become bankrupt or
insolvent?
Evidently, since Government can print any amount of money
it wants, it would become insolvent or bankrupt in a meaning
ful sense only if it printed so much money or incurred so much
debt in terms of that money that the public would be unwilling,
or less willing, to hold either the money or the bonded debt.
The general price level therefore affords a test of the sound
ness of money and the interest rate a test of the soundness
of debt. If the price level rises rapidly it usually means that
there is too much money and it also almost certainly indicates
that because people are losing confidence in it they are getting
rid of it (spending it) about as fast as they can. Since the
modern method of “printing money” is to sell bonds to banks,
the interest rate affords a running evaluation of its effects.
Rapidly rising prices and interest rates on Government debt
are the sure signs that deficits, spending, and debt are increas
ing more rapidly than available output of goods and services.
Rising prices mean that demand exceeds supply. You then
have “overemployment”! But increased demand is desirable
only when idle productive capacity makes increased supply
possible. Policies designed to stimulate spending through in
creased deficits and debts, either public or private, are appro
priate only when necessary to counter unemployment and
deflation. At such times increases in demand can be matched
by increases in supply and prices need not rise. Rising prices
provide the signal that demand is outrunning supply. Only in
time of war, when other considerations become paramount,
would it be defensible to continue money and debt creation
even in the face of the danger signals afforded by rising price
levels and interest rates. With an enlightened electorate it could
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not happen otherwise. Meanwhile it is hardly logical to argue
that increased spending (demand) should not be undertaken to
restore inadequate spending (demand) for fear we might go
too far and get too much spending (demand). This is tanta
mount to the argument that a starving man should not seek
more adequate food supplies because of the risk that he might
then suffer from overeating.
6. You can’t run a business that way. This one need not now
detain us very long. It is obvious from the facts presented in
Table 1 that this is indeed the way you do run any growing,
successful business. In fact we may add that a business that
is not run that way is not likely to be around very long. The
case of Montgomery Ward, which is still trying to recover
from its budget-balancing, debt-avoidance policies of the 1940’s
and early 1950’s, is perhaps an example worth considering.
7. A big Government debt frightens and discourages private
business. The fear element and its effect on profit expecta
tions is one which cannot be overlooked. To the extent that
the public believes that Government spending and debt may
lead to national bankruptcy and disaster, a real barrier to
development exists. Even if dangers are imaginary they have
harmful effects if they deter spending decisions. America’s
fears of deficits and debt could keep the country from carry
ing out production programs of which it is fully capable. World
War II provided one of the most dramatic examples of this.
The so-called “production miracles” of the war period would
have been quite possible at any time during the depressed
1930’s had the nation been willing to create and spend the
money to provide the necessary demand. Not until the appear
ance at Pearl Harbor of an enemy which seemed more dan
gerous than Government debt did the American people feel
free to loose the spending power necessary to bring into action
the production capacity that had been there all the time. Bonds
bought by banks which were supplied with additional reserves
for the purpose enabled the Government to create huge sums
of new money which it used to call forth the “production mir
acles.” When the war ended the people found themselves in
possession of this vastly increased money supply which they
then proceeded to spend for things they had been wanting for
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a long time. The money created during the war is still with
us and has provided the basic spending foundation for a period
of prosperity which up until the slowdown in recent years was
the greatest in the nation’s history.
The point which we must recognize here is that there is no
special economic magic in war as such. It is the spending for
war which provides the economic effects and war happened
to be the only project for which people deemed such public
spending justifiable. It is a simple matter of national balance
sheet and income analysis to demonstrate that the spendingincome and money supply effect would have been exactly the
same if the project had been that of building highways, streets,
schools, parks, research facilities, and free university educa
tion. However, if people believe that money and debt created
for such purposes are somehow tainted and that a day of
reckoning awaits a nation which conducts such activities for
any purpose except war, it is quite possible that we may again
hold back from achievements well within our power. Mean
while, the Russians, hampered by no such folklore or public
guilt complex, continue each year to increase their production
by the full amount which their actual physical capability per
mits. As a result, while American steel and other basic industry
has often operated well below capacity in recent years, our
principal enemy has used all of his powers to steadily close the
gap between us. Nobody there seems to worry much about
national bankruptcy.
In concluding our analysis of Government debt the follow
ing comments by a knowledgeable observer may serve to
broaden our perspective:
At every stage in the growth of that debt the nation has set up
the same cry of anguish and despair. At every stage in the
growth of that debt it has been seriously asserted by wise men
that bankruptcy and ruin were at hand. Yet still the debt went
on growing; and still bankruptcy and ruin were as remote as
ever . . .
The prophets of evil were under a double delusion. They erron
eously imagined that there was an exact analogy between the
case of an individual who is in debt to another individual and
the case of a society which is in debt to a part of itself . . . They
made no allowance for the effect produced by the incessant
progress of every experimental science, and by the incessant
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efforts of every man to get on in life. They saw that the debt
grew; and they forgot that other things grew as w ell as the
debt.

The words are familiar. The problem is not new. The “pro
phets of evil,” like Henny Penny, have been with us for a long
time. Although the situation described here bears a startling
similarity to American experience during the last thirty years,
the writer did not have us in mind. He was referring to another
great nation whose Government at the time he wrote had been
engaged in more or less continuous deficit spending for over
150 years during which that nation achieved an unchallenged
position as the greatest economic power the world had ever
known. The nation was Great Britain, the writer was the great
English scholar and historian, Thomas Babington Macaulay,
and the year was 1850!7

Deficit Spending: Public or Private?
As indicated in our Introduction, the logic of national income
accounting by no means requires Government deficit spending
for the maintenance of full employment. It only requires that
somebody must have deficits at least large enough to absorb
planned surpluses. We note in our models that everything ran
smoothly enough as long as profit prospects were assumed to
be sufficiently favorable to call forth the necessary private
deficits. It is here that the Practical Man may enter an objec
tion consistent both with his value judgments and with na
tional accounting principles. Here he at last has a chance of
bringing down a bird. To be sure, he has not failed to point
out that profits are often inadequate, but he has failed to
connect this fact with the relevant national income framework,
and his explanation of why they are inadequate is not always
fully convincing. Our Practical Man argues that profit pros
pects have led to inadequate private investment because of
anti-business attitudes and policies of Government. At the
same time he insists that the Government balance its budget
at all times. In fact, he regards an unbalanced budget as one
Bliss Perry, editor, Little Masterpieces, by Lord Macaulay. New York:
Doubleday & McClure Co., 1898, pp. 192, 198-199.
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of the anti-business discouragements. The stock market col
lapse as a reaction to President Kennedy’s steel price interven
tion has frequently been cited as another example of the harm
ful effects of government policy. (The latter argument inci
dentally overlooks the fact that the stock market collapse was
world wide and, except in France, considerably worse in
Europe than in America.) The logically consistent argument
which is possible here is that, if Government would only leave i
business alone, private deficits spurred by adequate profit
would insure the private spending necessary for full employ- j
ment. Government deficits would then be unnecessary. This
is essentially the position of a substantial proportion of the
business community and of thorough-going Conservatives.
There is no rigorous disproof available to rebut this position,
particularly since we are talking about the future in which all
things are possible. But-we can attempt to assess the probabili
ties, as contrasted with the possibilities, which are suggested
by past experience. On the basis of such probabilities we can
then consider the implications of a rigorously balanced budget
for the future.
The argument that government anti-business attitudes and
policies account for inadequate aggregate demand may have
a certain persuasiveness and perhaps real substance when
applied to a period of stagnation in which we simply have a
generally sluggish and hesitant economy. As noted above, it
is not necessary that a Kennedy or a Roosevelt actually intend
to conduct a campaign against business. It is enough if busi
nessmen believe it. But what about the periodic ups and downs
which we call the business cycle? These movements long
antedate both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Kennedy. How do we
account for the decline under President Eisenhower in 1958,
or, still more difficult, the far worse decline under President
Hoover from 1929 to 1933? Was President Eisenhower anti
business too? Was President Hoover even more so? The record
of history is that such movements have occurred in the past
regardless of what government did. It is a reasonable proba
bility that they will occur again. This being the case, how
can we test the Conservative position? It could not be tested
with a Kennedy or an Eisenhower, nor indeed with a Hoover,
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since, as we have noted, Mr. Hoover’s administration accepted
very substantial passive deficits. To test it, we should be
obliged to elect to the White House an uncompromising man
of stern Puritan principle and also give him a Congress of
like conviction. Only under such leadership in a severe reces
sion could we subject to the ultimate test of experience the
novel economic theory that the remedy for inadequate spend
ing is reduced spending. Such an experiment is not likely to
be attempted for the simple reason that the leaders of both
major political parties are fully aware of the probable influence
that it would have on the outcome of the next few dozen
national elections.

Program for the Practical Man
It is possible to identify three kinds of situations in which
modification or extension of present policies might reasonably
be expected to improve future prospects for profitable private
economic development and investment, thereby reducing the
need for Government deficit spending. In some of the situa
tions, the Practical Man might support revision of present busi
ness policies; in others he could support public policies which
in the long run would tend to increase private business activity.
I. Private policies based on market power.
1. Although we profess to believe in free, competitive mar
kets and have laws against monopoly, substantial sectors of
American industry have sufficient market power to hold prices
at levels which enable them to achieve predetermined profit
targets even when operating far below capacity. Whether,
anticipating stagnant demand, management sets high prices in
expectation of the high costs consequent upon low level utiliza
tion of capacity, or whether, by setting the high prices, man
agement causes the stagnation of demand is a hen-egg puzzle
that cannot be solved here. In either case more price competi
tion would lead to fuller utilization of capacity and to lower
unit costs. It was this philosophy which guided the first Henry
Ford and on which our anti-trust laws are based. But, as every
TV viewer and magazine reader knows, American industry
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appears to prefer any kind of competition to price competition.
In this area of fundamental policy making our Practical Man
is in the driver’s seat. Only he can make the change.
2. Labor unions often tend to look at hourly wage rates
rather than total wage bills. Even though a higher wage rate
may lead to unemployment of some workers or prevent entry
of additional workers by discouraging expansion of the indus
try or by speeding up automation, union leadership usually
prefers to have higher wages and less employment than lower
wages and a higher level of employment. Technological im
provements are sometimes opposed, or at least after their
introduction “feather-bedding” strongly resists any elimination
of displaced jobs. The inhibiting effect of such policies on prof
its, economic growth, and wider job opportunities is obvious.
To the Practical Man’s credit it must be recognized that he
has not failed to identify and oppose these practices.
3. Market power has been used to escape consumer sov
ereignty over design and style. It has been widely claimed
that American industry, particularly in highly concentrated
areas like automobiles, in dictating to the captive domestic
customer has not made the most of sales opportunities in the
foreign market. Those who seek to make this point do not
emphasize price but argue that, since so large a part of our
manufacturing market is at home, our manufacturers have
not made adequate efforts in design, styling, and sales pro
motion to meet foreign competition in foreign markets. Abroad
one notices less emphasis on advertising and product differen
tiation and less reluctance to mention price. Whatever may be
the facts relating to our foreign markets, this is probably a fair
description of what happened in the automobile industry in the
late 1950’s. American automobile manufacturers modified de
sign, size, and style and turned to compacts only when foreign
competition forced it.
II. Public policies based on the idea that higher prices and
reduced output represent the best remedy for inadequate
demand.
1. Agricultural price supports and output restrictions raise
the cost of food and other farm products, thereby raising con-
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sumer cost of living and affording huge windfalls to wealthy
farmers without greatly aiding poor farmers whom the pro
gram is mainly intended to help. The economy has thus been
denied much of the benefit of the great agricultural productiv
ity gains of recent decades. At the same time, by failing to con
centrate attention on the large numbers of farmers at the lower
end of the income scale, the program tends to put off solution
of the underlying problem of too many people on farms. The
Practical Man has not given us much help on this one. In fact
in the agricultural industry itself differences of opinion among
the people involved have so far effectively blocked a solution
to the problem. Controversy over the recent wheat referendum
affords a familiar example.
2. Various Government policies both at Federal and state
levels are designed to limit competition and to maintain price
at the expense of volume. Among these one may list (a) oil
and other import quotas, (b) tariff exceptions for the benefit
of industries which operate under especially severe disadvan
tages in their efforts to meet consumer needs at prices compar
able with available foreign sources, (c) Fair Trade laws, (d)
transportation rates and regulations limiting competition
among carriers, (e) state oil production controls which limit
output of efficient producers but which allow drilling of any
number of new wells the output of which will also be re
stricted, (f) state milk control and similar boards. In all of
these cases our Practical Man, representing this or that par
ticular industry, has been the principal offender. In almost
every instance Government has intervened to restrict the free
dom of private enterprise for the benefit of a particular group
and has done so at the request of the private enterprisers them
selves. While vigorously condemning all restrictions on free
enterprise for the benefit of others, each industry defends with
equal vigor the restrictions imposed on others for its own
benefit.
III. Public activities now unprofitable for private enterprise
but likely to provide opportunities for profitable private
investment in the long run.
1. Research and development in industrial uses of atomic
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energy, space travel and communication, production of fresh
water from the sea, and certain education programs are exam
ples of activities in which the pioneering must be done by Gov
ernment for the simple reason that they are not profitable for
private enterprise at this stage. Once the ground work has been
laid free enterprise may move in. Private industry is already
moving into the generation of electricity by atomic energy and :
AT&T’s Telstar program has captured the imagination of the
world. (We can just imagine what AT&T’s debt will look like in
another twenty years!) Granting the prospect for increasing <
importance of training and education in the future, and re- :
membering the spectacular benefits which the nation now
enjoys from the massive postwar investment in human capital
under the G.I. Bill of Rights, the potential of the public educa
tion contribution should be clear. We also have the example
of America’s world leadership in agricultural techniques,
mainly the result of Government-financed research. These are
all activities which no private firm could have afforded to con
duct, at least not in time to keep America ahead of her rivals
and enemies. Since the Practical Man will obviously benefit
from such programs in the long run, would he not be wise to
give them his support?
2. Aid to undeveloped countries, especially in education, can
yield immeasurable benefits in the long run. We need to look
ahead a century or so and overlook such short-run, inconse
quential matters as whether the individuals who happen to be
alive today hate us or love us, are “grateful” for aid, or “follow
our line.” How many popularity contests could the English have
won in our country during the fifty years after Lexington and
Concord? Looking to the long run future with historical per
spective the development of our relations with the emergent
nations clearly takes on a crucial aspect. Together with our
allies in Western Europe we represent probably less than onesixth of the human race. Unless we believe that intellectual
capacity is a monopoly held by one race of men this means
that five-sixths of the best brain power, which is what will
count in the future, is outside our sphere. When these people
achieve development, as they will, they will represent the
greatest market, and by far the greatest source of human capi-
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tal in the world. How fortunate it would be for us at that time
if development of their cultural values and trade, the orienta
tion of their learning, the very evolution of their languages,
would continue to find their external influences mainly in the
Western World and especially in America. Today virtually all
of these nations conduct their courts, parliaments, and univer
sities in European languages, usually English. Here in lan
guage is a vital channel of communication which tends to be
denied to the Russians and Chinese in direct proportion as
we continue to use it through education and other contacts.
To discontinue such activities through pique or misguided
“economy” is simply to leave the future to the Russians and
Chinese.
Government activities such as those listed under III need
not be conducted by deficit spending, though of course they
afford outlets for deficit spending at times when the stimulus
is appropriate. In the long run, by stimulating profitable
opportunities for private business investment, they should
minimize the need for Government deficit spending.

Concluding Observations
Various programs along the lines outlined above should tend
to make our free enterprise system more viable in the long run.
But meanwhile we are still faced with the problem of the
business cycle with its intermittent periods of insufficient
spending and inadequate demand. The reader who has come
this far may now ask, “Why all the public acrimony? Why so
much fuss? Isn’t the picture fairly clear?”
To be sure, from the viewpoint of the professional economist
or accountant the situation is clear enough. Indeed it is obvi
ous. In terms of accounting identities adequate deficit spend
ing and adequate debt creation are simply the source of ade
quate demand (adequate sales volume!). In fact we can readily
outline the highlights of modern economic history without any
more data than annual statistics of the nation’s total debt.
When debt grows at a satisfactory rate we find prosperity;
when it grows slowly we find recession; and when it actually
declines we encounter deep depression and chaos. There is no
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doubt about this. It is the record of history. And we have now
seen why it is so. After we have done all we can to encourage
private spending the only remaining question of policy is this:
When private deficits are inadequate should we choose to fill
the gap with public deficits or should we choose unemploy
ment? If another choice exists it has not been identified.
And so the puzzle persists. Why all the misunderstanding?
We are obliged to go back more than a century and a half to
find a parallel. The split between professional economists
and the general public on the issue of free trade probably
affords the best comparison. From the very birth of the Repub
lic this issue was a source of bitter controversy. Although a
civil war was fought over it, that war did not settle it. Not
until 1962 could we say that virtually all responsible groups
in the nation had more or less officially come to accept what
economists had been pointing out ever since the days of Adam
Smith. Perhaps it is also worth noting that even the free trade
case was not nearly so clear cut as the deficit spending case.
For in the free trade case it is possible to identify producer
interests which are indeed different from consumer interests,
at least, in the short run. In the deficit spending case there is
no such conflict of interest. When demand is inadequate and
depression develops every one suffers. The nation suffers.
When demand is adequate the entire economy blooms.
It is precisely at this point that the economist himself encoun
ters a puzzle. How can the principal beneficiaries of appropri
ately timed Government deficits also be the chief opponents of
this policy? For who has more to gain from good business than
a business man, and who has more to lose when business is
bad? It is a well known fact that the initial impact of recession
is always on profits. Profit is the volatile element in national
income and is always the first to melt away when demand
becomes inadequate. No matter how industrious and competent
they may be, enterprisers as a group find that the cards are
hopelessly stacked against them when aggregate demand is
on the decline. Business cannot sell unless the customers buy.
Perhaps one reason why the Practical Man has opposed poli
cies beneficial to business is that he has not looked at the whole
picture. This was obviously the case after World War II when
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he rejoiced in his growing bank account but deplored the
growing Government debt which produced it. But the econo
mist must also bear some of the blame. He has rarely seemed
able to explain the mysteries of money, debt, and income crea
tion in terms understandable to the general public. And in spite
of the fact that every economics textbook of the past fifteen
years has sought to explain in painful detail the principles out
lined in this article, university economists can scarcely claim
to have sent their students away with a crystal clear picture
of how our money system operates. Probably neither the Prac
tical Man nor the economist can take much credit in the public
debate which has occurred. In fact there has been little genuine
debate because there has been so little communication. The
Practical Man and the press have tended to pontificate about
technical matters which they have not understood clearly;
while the economist on his part has frequently shown little
patience or forebearance and has seldom devoted much time
to the improvement of public understanding. Yet the problem
is crucially important to the success of our democracy. The
issues need to be clearly defined, the assumptions explicitly
stated, and the discussion conducted with a degree of ojectivity
not achieved up to now. Meanwhile we might reflect on the
comment which Professor A. C. Pigou made forty years ago in
connection with the free trade issue: “There is indeed a long
time lag between the attainment of knowledge in economic
affairs and its entry into the halls of authority.”

